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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on Monetary Economics and Financial Economics. 
(August 2006) 
Sok Won Kim, B.B.A., Seoul National University; 
M.B.A., Seoul National University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dennis Jansen 
 In this dissertation three different economic issues have been analyzed. The first 
issue is whether monetary policy rules can improve forecasting accuracy of inflation. 
The second is whether the preference of a central bank is symmetry or not. The last issue 
is whether the behavior of aggregate dividends is asymmetry. Each issue is considered in 
Chapter II, III and IV, respectively. 
The linkage between monetary policy rules and the prediction of inflation is explored 
in Chapter II. Our analysis finds that the prediction performance of the term structure 
model hinges on monetary policy rules, which involve the manipulation of the federal 
funds rate in response to the change in the price level. As the Fed's reaction to inflation 
becomes stronger, the predictive information contained in the term structure becomes 
weaker. Using the long-run Taylor rule, a new assessment of the prediction performance 
regarding future change in inflation is provided. The empirical results indicate that the 
long-run Taylor rule improves forecasting accuracy.  
In chapter III, the asymmetric preferences of the central bank of Korea are examined 
under New Keynesian sticky prices forward-looking economy framework. To this end, 
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this chapter adopts the central bank’s objective functional form as a linear-exponential 
function instead of the standard quadratic function. The monetary policy reaction 
function is derived and then asymmetric preference parameters are estimated during the 
inflation targeting period: 1998:9-2005:12. The empirical evidence supports that while 
the objective of output stability is symmetry, but the objective of price stability is not 
symmetry. Specifically, it appears that the central bank of Korea aggressively responds 
to positive inflation gaps compared to negative inflation gaps. 
Chapter IV examines the nonlinear dividend behavior of the aggregate stock market. 
We propose a nonlinear dividend model that assumes managers minimize the regime 
dependent adjustment costs associated with being away from their target dividend 
payout. By using the threshold vector error correction model, we find significant 
evidence of a threshold effect in aggregate dividends of S&P 500 Index in quarterly data 
when real stock prices are used for the target. We also find that when dividends are 
relatively higher than target, the adjustment cost of dividends is much smaller than that 
when they are lower. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to analyze three different economic issues: 
inflation forecasting with the monetary policy rule, an asymmetric preference of central 
bank, and an asymmetric adjustment in aggregate dividends. Each issue is covered in 
Chapter II, III and IV, respectively. The main findings are summarized in Chapter V. 
With regard to inflation forecasting, we consider a term structure model of inflation 
forecasting in Chapter II. The rational expectations model implies that asset prices 
reflect forward-looking behavior in the financial market. In particular, the term structure 
of interest rates provides potential information on the prediction of interest rates and 
inflation according to the expectations hypothesis and the Fisher equation. The 
predictive information contained in the yield curve has been analyzed in many empirical 
studies. The empirical results show that the prediction performance of the term structure 
model varies depending on the maturities of the yield curve and the sample period. 
Mishkin (1990) has shown that the term structure provides almost no information about 
the future change in inflation for maturities of six months or less. 
It is natural to ask what affects the prediction performance of the term structure model. 
It is noteworthy that the term structure of interest rates reveals the stylized facts of 
temporal persistence as discussed in Seo (2003) compared to  the variation of the change 
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in inflation. The stylized facts indicate imbalance in regression. Many studies have 
shown that the persistence of the term spread is related to the monetary policy. For 
example, Mankiw and Miron (1986) provided empirical results that the predictive 
information of the term structure began to disappear after the founding of the Federal 
Reserve and its manipulation of interest rates. Necessarily, the variation in inflation is 
associated with the Fed's reaction to inflation. 
Another important issue in forecasting inflation is associated with parameter 
instability. The Phillips curve relates the unemployment rate to a measure of inflation. 
Thus, the Phillips-curve-based inflation forecasts have been used widely in monetary 
policymaking. However, these forecasts have been found to be sensitive to instability, 
particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s.  
Although there is a vast literature on the monetary policy rules, there have been no 
attempts to relate the monetary policy rules to the prediction of inflation. In this chapter, 
we consider the inflation forecasts using the monetary policy rules. As the monetary 
policy rules may differ between the monetary policy regimes, we examine the parameter 
stability by using the statistical methods. 
In this chapter, using the U.S. monthly data for the period January 1960-December 
2004, an empirical assessment of the linkage between the monetary policy rules and the 
prediction of inflation is provided. As the rational expectations model does not consider 
the effect of the monetary policy rules, this study resolves the mismatch between 
economic theory and empirical findings. 
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In Chapter III, the preference of central banks is analyzed under their asymmetric 
objective function. In analyzing their optimal monetary policy or monetary policy rules, 
traditionally literature has assumed that the preferences of the central banks are 
symmetric over key macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and output. However, 
recently a growing number of papers have questioned this symmetric preference 
assumption: specifically, are negative deviations of inflation from target as undesirable 
as positive deviations of inflation from target of the same amount? And/or are positive 
output gaps as distasteful as negative output gaps of the same size?   
The asymmetric loss function generally leads to a nonlinear reaction function or 
monetary policy rule which is the first order condition solved for the optimization 
problem of central banks. Whether the central bank has the asymmetric objective 
function is an important issue since many of the results on the time consistency problem 
under symmetric preferences may no longer hold under asymmetric preferences as 
shown in Nobay and Peel (2003), and Surcio (2003a). 
Recently the way of conducting monetary policy in Korea was changed dramatically. 
After the Bank of Korea Act revised in April 1998, the inflation targeting was adopted as 
new monetary policy system. In addition the Bank of Korea, which is the central bank in 
Korea, uses interest rate as its monetary policy instrument instead of monetary 
aggregates. Since the Bank of Korea has set up the explicit inflation target from 1998, 
the study on its asymmetric preference of inflation will have an advantage over assuming 
the implicit inflation target frequently used for the non-inflation targeting countries, for 
example United States. 
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The goal of this chapter examines the possible asymmetric preference of the central 
bank in Korea during the inflation targeting period: 1998:9-2005:12. Specifically, we try 
to answer the question whether the preferences for inflation or/and output gap of the 
central bank in Korea are asymmetry or not.  
Chapter IV investigates the asymmetric behavior of aggregate dividends. After 
Lintner (1956) proposed the well-known behavioral model of dividend policy, a number 
of papers try to model the behavior of dividend in both disaggregate and aggregate level. 
For aggregate level, Marsh and Merton (1987) developed the dynamic behavior model of 
aggregate dividend which has a feature that dividend is adjusted to its long run target 
dividend (i.e., error correction term). Garrett and Priestley (2000) generalize Lintner 
model by introducing the manager's optimizing behavior. Most literature has analyzed 
the dividend behavior in the linear functional form.  
However, there is some possibility that adjustment of dividends may not be a linear 
process. An important feature of dividends behavior is that there is asymmetry in 
dividend payments due to, for instance, a reluctance to cut dividends. For example, Yoon 
and Starks (1995) document the evidence that there is an asymmetry between dividend 
increases and dividend decreases at the individual firm level. Jalilvand and Harris (1984) 
examined the process of partial adjustment by allowing speeds of adjustment to vary by 
firm and over time depending on the size of firm and capital market conditions such as 
interest rates and stock prices. In addition, Marsh and Merton (1987) supported 
asymmetric adjustment of dividends.  
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Therefore, we examine whether adjustment cost of dividends depends on the state of 
previous difference between dividends and the target. For example, adjustment cost of 
dividends faced by managers may be low (or high) when the previous dividends are 
above the target than when those are below the target. Under this regime dependent 
adjustment cost hypothesis, we are able to induce the model in which the changes of 
dividends follow the nonlinear error correction process from managers' optimization 
problem minimizing the costs of dividends adjustment. Using the threshold vector error 
correction model (VECM) proposed by Hansen and Seo (2002), we can estimate the 
nonlinear adjustment process of dividends. Specifically, this chapter analyzes the 
asymmetric adjustment behavior of the aggregate dividends in stock market with the 
threshold VECM, which allows for nonlinear adjustment cost and cointegration 
relationship. Dividends are corresponding of S&P 500 Stock Price Index. Real stock 
prices are used for a proxy for the target.  
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CHAPTER II 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS, LONG-RUN TAYLOR RULE, AND 
 FORECASTING INFLATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The rational expectations model implies that asset prices reflect forward-looking 
behavior in the financial market, and therefore they have been used as predictors of 
economic growth, business cycles, and future changes in inflation. In particular, the term 
structure of interest rates provides potential information on the prediction of interest 
rates and inflation according to the expectations hypothesis and the Fisher equation. 
However, the monetary authority manipulates the short-term interest rate in response to 
macro fundamentals such as the changes in the price level and real economic activity, 
and accordingly the prediction of inflation hinges on the monetary policy rules. This 
paper investigates the linkage between the monetary policy rules and the prediction of 
inflation, and provides an assessment of the predictive performance of the term structure 
and the monetary policy rules regarding future changes in inflation. 
The predictive information contained in the yield curve has been analyzed in many 
empirical studies. The empirical results show that the prediction performance of the term 
structure model varies depending on the maturities of the yield curve and the sample 
period. Mishkin (1990) has shown that the term structure provides almost no information 
about the future change in inflation for maturities of six months or less. Fama (1990) has 
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pointed out the variation in the real term structure, which affects the prediction 
performance of the term structure model. Mishkin (1991) also provided empirical results 
showing that the term structure provides information of predicting inflation in two or 
three countries out of the 10 OECD countries examined. 
It is natural to ask what affects the prediction performance of the term structure model. 
It is noteworthy that the term structure of interest rates reveals the stylized facts of 
temporal persistence as discussed in Seo (2003) compared to the variation of the change 
in inflation. The stylized facts indicate imbalance in regression. 
Many studies have shown that the persistence of the term spread is related to the 
monetary policy. Mankiw and Miron (1986) provided empirical results that the 
predictive information of the term structure began to disappear after the founding of the 
Federal Reserve and its manipulation of interest rates. Woodford (1999) and Rudebusch 
(2002) suggested that the central bank tends to adjust the target interest rate gradually, 
and thus such inertial monetary policy also implies the slow adjustment of the term 
spread. Clarida et al. (2000) have shown that the macroeconomic stability is closely 
related to the monetary policy rules, which involve the manipulation of the short-term 
interest rate as instrument to achieve the target inflation and the desirable output level. 
Necessarily, the variation in inflation is associated with the Fed's reaction to inflation. 
Although there is a vast literature on the monetary policy rules, there have been no 
attempts to relate the monetary policy rules to the prediction of inflation. This paper is to 
provide an empirical assessment of the linkage between the monetary policy rules and 
the prediction of inflation. As the rational expectations model does not consider the 
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effect of the monetary policy rules, this study resolves the mismatch between economic 
theory and empirical findings. 
Another important issue in forecasting inflation is associated with parameter 
instability. The Phillips curve relates the unemployment rate to a measure of inflation. 
Thus, the Phillips-curve-based inflation forecasts have been used widely in monetary 
policymaking. However, these forecasts have been found to be sensitive to instability, 
particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s. Consequently, Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) 
argue that the likelihood of drawing an accurate prediction of a change in inflation is no 
better than a coin flipping. In this paper, we consider the inflation forecasts using the 
monetary policy rules. As the monetary policy rules may differ between the monetary 
policy regimes, we examine the parameter stability by using the statistical methods. 
In the paper, we undertake an empirical analysis of this linkage using the U.S. 
monthly data for the period January 1960-December 2004. First, we estimate the long-
run Taylor rule, which is composed of the federal funds rate and the 12-month inflation 
rate. The coefficient of reaction to inflation varies depending on the sample period and 
across the monetary policy regimes. Second, the prediction of inflation is found to be 
associated with the Fed's reaction to inflation. The coefficient of the term structure is 
significant for the sample period when the coefficient of reaction to inflation is close to 
unity. As the parameter of reaction to inflation increases, the predictive information 
contained in the term structure becomes weaker. This result explains the previous 
empirical findings that the predictive information of the term structure varies depending 
on the sample period. Third, an assessment of the prediction performance regarding 
  
9 
future change in inflation is provided using the long-run Taylor rule. The empirical 
results indicate that the long-run Taylor rule improves forecasting accuracy. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 deals with the term structure model 
and the influence of the monetary policy rules on the prediction of inflation. Section 2.3 
discusses the econometric methods to assess the information contained in the term 
structure and the long-run Taylor rule. The main results are provided in Section 2.4. 
 
2.2 The Model 
 
The Fisher equation implies that the nominal interest rates reflect expectations of 
inflation, and therefore the term structure provides potential and useful information 
about the future path of inflation. Fama (1990) and Mishkin (1990) assessed the 
predictive information contained in the term structure based on the following model. 
                      mt
l
t
m
tlttmtt uRR +++ +−+=− )(,, αµpipi ,                                         (2.1) 
where htt +,pi  is the h-step ahead inflation, and 
h
tR  is the nominal yield on a security with 
a maturity of h for h=m, l and m>l .  
The term structure model (2.1) implies that the change in inflation depends on the 
term structure of interest rates. From the Fisher equation, the nominal interest rate ( htR ) 
is composed of the real interest rate ( htκ ) and the expected inflation as follows: 
                          ),(
, httt
h
t
h
t ER ++= piκ                                                    (2.2) 
where )(⋅tE  is the conditional expectation based on the information available at time t. 
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By taking a difference of l-step ahead inflation from m-step ahead inflation, we get 
the term structure model (2.1) and the following conditions. 
                  )( ltmtE κκµ −−=  
                  1=α  
              )].()[()]([)]([
,,,,
l
t
m
tt
l
t
m
tltttlttmtttmttmt EEEu κκκκpipipipi −−−−−−−= +++++  
If we assume rational expectations and the constancy of the real term structure, 
0)( =+mtt uE  holds in equation (2.1) and the error mtu +  is exogenous to the variables in 
the current information set. As a result, the future change in inflation has a linear 
relationship with the term structure with a unit slope. Therefore, the term structure 
provides systematic information about the future path of inflation. 
The prediction performance of the term structure model has been examined in many 
empirical studies. The results show that the predictability of inflation varies depending 
on the maturities of the yield curve and the sample period. Mishkin (1990) has shown 
that the term structure of interest rates provides almost no information about the future 
change in inflation for maturities of six months or less. Fama (1990) has pointed out the 
variation in the real term structure, which brings in less-successful performance of the 
term structure model. Mishkin (1991) also provided empirical results showing that the 
term structure provides information of predicting inflation in two or three countries out 
of the 10 OECD countries examined. 
It is natural to ask what affects the prediction of inflation based on the rational 
expectations model. One plausible explanation, suggested in previous studies, is related 
to the non-spherical errors, which may affect the prediction performance of the term 
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structure model. The term structure model involves the overlapping data, which 
generates serial correlation in the error term inevitably. However, the problem of 
overlapping data becomes more severe for long-period ahead inflation forecasting while 
the empirical evidences are less favorable in forecasting inflation for maturities of six 
months or less. 
The term structure of interest rates reveals the stylized facts of temporal persistence 
and nonlinear mean reversion as shown by Seo (2003). On the other hand, the change in 
inflation is relatively less persistent, and thus the stylized facts indicate imbalance 
between the term structure and the change in inflation. 
It has been shown in many studies that the persistence of the term spread is related to 
the monetary policy. Mankiw and Miron (1986) provided empirical results that the 
predictability of the term structure began to disappear after the founding of the Federal 
Reserve and its manipulation of interest rates. Rudebusch (1995) and Balduzzi et al. 
(1997) also found that the changes in the interest rate were due to the Fed's unexpected 
changes in its target interest rate. As Woodford (1999) suggests, the central bank tends 
to adjust interest rates gradually, and thus such inertial monetary policy also implies the 
slow adjustment of the term spread. 
According to the expectations hypothesis, the long-term interest rate is the average of 
the current and future short-term interest rates. 
                                   ,)(1
1
1 t
m
i
itt
m
t qRE
m
R += 
=
−+                                               (2.3) 
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where mtR  is the yield on a security with a maturity of m, tR  is the yield on the unit-
maturity security, and tq  is the liquidity premium. 
The expectations hypothesis (2.3) can be written as follows: 
                           .)(1
1
1
1

−
=
−
=
−+ +∆=−
m
i
t
m
ij
jmttt
m
t qRE
m
RR   
If the liquidity premium is constant, the expectations hypothesis implies that the term 
structure or the yield curve provides information on the future change in the short-term 
interest rate. Thus, the expectations hypothesis implies that the change in the short-term 
interest rate depends on the term structure. However, the empirical findings suggest that 
the persistence of the term structure is closely related to the Fed's control of interest rates. 
In particular, Taylor (1993) suggested the monetary policy rules. The monetary authority 
regulates the target interest rate ( *tr ) in response to the macro fundamentals: one-year 
inflation rate ( tpi ) and output gap ( ty ) as follows. 
                              ttt yrr θpipiβ +−+= )( *** ,                                                    (2.4) 
where *r  is the desired nominal rate, which is compatible with the inflation target *pi . 
 The Fed's reaction function has been estimated by assuming the partial adjustment 
process in Clarida et al. (2000) and Rudebusch (2002). 
                                  1
*)1(
−
+−= ttt rrr ρρ  
                                1))(1( −+++−= ttt rvy ρθβpiρ , 
where tr  is the actual federal funds rate and ** βpi−= rv . Rudebusch (2002) estimated 
the reaction function and found that the partial adjustment coefficient ρ is large and 
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significant, which supports the monetary policy inertia. Judd and Rudebusch (1998) used 
the error correction specification because the unit root hypotheses of the interest rates 
cannot be rejected. 
                                     tttt rLCrrr ∆+−=∆ + )()( *1 φ  
                                      .)()( tttt rLCvyr ∆+−−−= θβpiφ  
If φ <0, the federal funds rate adjusts to the equilibrium error between the actual 
funds rate and the optimal target rate. The equilibrium error disappears eventually, 
which implies a long-run equilibrium relationship. The long-run relationship is governed 
by two highly persistent variables: the federal funds rate and the inflation rate. 
                                            .ttt rw βpi−=                                                   (2.5) 
The long-run coefficient β  is the parameter of reaction to inflation. If tw  is 
stationary, the long-run monetary policy rules form a long-run relationship based on the 
definition of Engle and Granger (1987). The output gap is stationary, and it affects the 
long-run relationship temporarily. This specification makes our empirical analysis 
simple and tractable. However, our analysis can be extended to the monetary policy rules 
that include real economic activity. If we include the output gap, the influence of the 
monetary policy rules on the prediction of inflation can be explained by the variation in 
the output gap. 
The rational expectations model does not consider the Fed's control of interest rates in 
response to inflation. The expectations hypothesis implies the long-run relationship 
between the short rate and the long rate. However, if the monetary policy rules are 
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effective, the short rate converges to the target rate, which can be different from the long 
rate. Thus, the relationship between the term structure and the change in inflation 
becomes weaker. 
The long-run relationship tw  can be written as follows: 
                       ).()()( tmttmtttttt EERRrw pipiβpiβ −+−+−= ++   
The long-run Taylor rule tw  is composed of the term spread, the relationship between 
the long-term rate and the expected inflation, and the expected change in inflation. 
Accordingly, the long-run monetary policy rules imply a relationship between the term 
structure and the change in inflation. 
                                            ,)(1 mttttmt rR ++ +−=− ηβpipi                                        (2.6) 
where 
                              ).()]()[(1 mttmtmtttttmt EERr ++++ −+−−−= pipipiββpiβη  
If the long-run parameter β  equals one, the long-run Taylor rule reduces to the short-
term realized real interest rate. Also, the relationship between the long-term rate and the 
expected inflation becomes the long-term real interest rate. If we assume the constancy 
of the real term structure, the implied term structure model becomes close to the rational 
expectations model. In that case, the long-run monetary policy rules are consistent with 
the rational expectations model. 
However, this is a special case. If β  is different from one, the slope and the error in 
(2.6) depend on the parameter β . First, an increase in the long-run reaction parameter 
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leads to a decrease in the slope, which lowers the effect of the term structure in 
predicting inflation. Second, if β  is different from one, the term structure model is valid 
under the constancy of the long-run monetary policy rules. In general, the change in 
inflation depends on the long-run monetary policy rules as well as the term structure. 
Third, the discrepancy between the Fisher equation and the long-run monetary policy 
rules increases as β  increases. The discrepancy generates uncertainty in forecasting 
inflation, and as a result the variance of the error increases and the relevancy of the 
forecasts may diminish. Finally, the prediction performance of the term structure model 
can be affected by parameter uncertainty in the reaction parameter β . 
The parameter uncertainty cannot be overlooked because it affects the prediction of 
inflation severely. Clarida et al. (2000) related the monetary policy rules to 
macroeconomic stability. The reaction parameter may change across the monetary policy 
regimes, which generates parameter uncertainty in forecasting inflation. Furthermore, 
the Fed's reaction may vary over the business cycle. The monetary authority is likely to 
focus on the prevention of inflation in the boom while high unemployment becomes the 
main concern in the recession. The central bank's regime-dependent preferences have 
been suggested in Ruge-Murcia (2003), which also produces parameter uncertainty in 
forecasting inflation. 
When the long-run monetary policy rules include other macro fundamentals, 
uncertainty in forecasting inflation inevitably increases. In addition, the term structure is 
associated with real economic activity as shown by Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), and 
the measurement of output gap accompanies informational limitation as discussed in 
  
16 
Orphanides (2003). These factors increase uncertainty and reduce the relevancy of the 
inflation forecasts. 
The predictability of the term structure model has been measured in many studies. 
However, the assessment of the term structure information has been based on the 
rational expectations model, and the long-run aspects of the monetary policy rules have 
not been considered. In this study, we examine the prediction of inflation using the long-
run information contained in the monetary policy rules. 
 
2.3 Methodology  
 
2.3.1 Forecasting Models 
 
Denote tpi  as the 12-month inflation rate, tr  as the federal funds rate, and tR  as the 
yield on the one-year Treasury note. Our model of forecasting inflation is based on the 
following:   
  .)()(
1
mtit
k
i
itttttmt rrR +−
=
+ +∆+−+−+=−  ηpiγβpiλαµpipi                 (2.7) 
Our model (2.7) is very close to the forecasting model used by Stock and Watson 
(1999), which explains the change in inflation using the term structure information. Our 
forecasting model incorporates the information of the long-run monetary policy rules. 
The long-run Taylor rule accompanies the parameter β , which signifies the Fed's 
reaction to inflation. In the paper, we estimate the long-run parameter β  by using 
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reduced rank regression on the vector error correction model. The lagged values of the 
differenced inflation are added to reduce serial correlation in the error. If 0=λ , our 
model becomes the term structure model as follows:  
             mtit
k
i
itttmt rR +−
=
+ +∆+−+=−  ηpiγαµpipi
1
)( .                                   (2.8) 
Thus, if the long-run information of the monetary policy rules does not help explain the 
change in inflation, our model reduces to the forecasting model using the term structure 
information, which has been proposed by Stock and Watson (1999).  
 The Martingale property of inflation has been suggested in several studies such as 
Atkeson and Ohanian (2001). The Martingale property implies that the future change in 
inflation is unpredictable. We treat the random walk model as the reference model to 
evaluate the inflation forecasting models. 
                            mttmt ++ +=− ηµpipi .                                                      (2.9) 
We compare the predictive performance of the inflation forecasting models-Model A: 
the random walk model; Model B: the forecasting model that uses the term structure; 
and Model C: the forecasting model that uses the term structure and the long-run 
monetary policy rules.  
 
2.3.2 Parameter Stability 
 
When we evaluate the forecasting models, we need to consider parameter uncertainty 
because it affects the prediction accuracy severely. As discussed in Clarida et al. (2000), 
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the monetary policy rules may differ between the monetary policy regimes. To examine 
the parameter stability, we implement the tests for structural change in the reaction 
parameter of the Taylor rule. 
      ,)(1)(1 2*2*1 tttt ttttr ωpiβpiβ +>+≤=                                (2.10) 
where 1() is the indicator function, and *t  is the date of the break point. 
In policy regime 1, the Fed reacts to inflation by adjusting the target rate with the 
coefficient 1β . In policy regime 2, the magnitude of reaction may change depending on 
the coefficient 2β . If the magnitude of reaction to inflation does not vary across regimes, 
the linear error correction model is valid. Therefore, the tests for structural change in the 
long-run Taylor rule can be based on the following hypotheses: 
                                210 : ββ =H  against .: 211 ββ ≠H  
We assume that the date of structural change is unknown. Although the dates of the 
monetary policy regimes are known, it is the general case that the true date of break may 
differ from the historical date. Thus, the testing for structural change entails the nuisance 
parameter *t , which cannot be identified under the null hypothesis as discussed in 
Andrews (1993). We use the optimal test statistics defined in Seo (1998). 
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The algorithm to compute the test statistics is as follows. First, we estimate the linear 
error correction model. Second, we calculate the LM statistics using the null model and 
parameter estimates for each break point ].,[* UL ttt ∈  The trimming values can be chosen 
symmetrically with the trimming probability P, for example, .10 or .15. Third, we find 
the average, the weighted average, and the maximum of the LM statistics. As the test 
statistics follow nonstandard distributions, we use the critical values suggested in Seo 
(1998). If the test statistic is greater than the critical value, we reject the null hypothesis 
of no structural change. 
 
2.4 Main Results 
 
In the empirical analysis, we use the monthly data of the federal funds rate (= tr ) and 
the yield on the one-year U.S. Treasury note (= tR ). The 12-month inflation rate is 
calculated using the consumer price index (CPI). That is, 100)log(log 12 ×−= −ttt PPpi , 
where tP  is the CPI. 
The data set is obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data1 for the sample 
period January 1960-December 2004 (1960:1-2004:12). The estimation of the model and 
the in-sample forecasts are based on the sample period 1960:1-1999:12. The out-of-
sample forecasts are obtained for the period 2000:1-2004:12.  
                                                 
1
 Http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2. 
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Figure 2.1 shows the change in inflation of 12-month horizon, which is tt pipi −+12 . 
The time plot of the term spread is provided in Figure 2.2. The term spread, defined as 
tt rR − , varies slowly compared to the variation of the change in inflation.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Change in Inflation  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Term Spread  
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Because the term structure predictability may depend on the monetary policy rules, 
we investigate this linkage statistically. Our empirical analysis involves the estimation of 
the long-run Taylor rule, and so we examine the time series behavior of the variables to 
estimate the long-run Taylor rule. Table 2.1 shows the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
unit root tests. The unit root hypothesis of the 12-month inflation rate cannot be rejected 
for each AR lag length from 1 to 7. The federal funds rate shows mixed results. At the 
AR lag length 2, the ADF test rejects the unit root hypothesis while the unit root 
hypothesis maintains at other lag lengths. At the AR lag length 3, which is chosen by the 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the ADF test cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
unit root in the federal funds rate. The yield on the one-year Treasury note is persistent 
and the unit root hypotheses cannot be rejected. 
      
Table 2.1 
Unit Root Tests 
Variables AR Lag Length 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
tpi  -1.470 -1.895 -2.160 -2.046 -2.165 -2.463 -2.507 
tr  -2.315 -3.290 -2.811 -2.727 -2.501 -2.484 -2.367 
tR  -2.169 -2.984 -2.362 -2.371 -2.279 -2.523 -1.996 
The critical value at the 5% significance level is -2.867. 
 
 
Table 2.2 shows the cointegration tests for the term structure and the long-run Taylor 
rule, which is composed of the federal funds rate and the 12-month inflation rate. The 
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long-run Taylor rule implies that these two variables have a long-run relationship. At the 
VAR lag order 2, the Johansen cointegration test rejects the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration at the 5% significance level. However, at the VAR lag order 3, which is 
chosen by the BIC, the trace statistic for cointegration is slightly less than the 5% critical 
value. The cointegration tests support the long-run relationship of the term structure 
between the federal funds rate and the long-term interest rate at each VAR lag length. 
Therefore, the term structure contains the long-run information of predicting the short-
term interest rate. 
      
Table 2.2 
Cointegration Tests 
Variables VAR Lag Length 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
(
tr , tpi ) 13.252 23.114 19.223 17.736 16.435 17.977 
(
tr , tR ) 53.737 57.543 39.293 34.019 24.414 24.786 
5% critical value  is 20.262. The VAR lag length selected by the BIC is 3 for each model. 
 
 
Using the bivariate error correction model, the long-run Taylor rule is estimated at the 
VAR lag length 3, which is chosen by the BIC. As shown in Table 2.3, for the sample 
period 1960:1-1999:12, the long-run coefficient is close to one, which is compatible with 
the rational expectations model. However, the reaction coefficient varies widely across 
the monetary policy regimes. The magnitude of reaction to inflation increased in the 
Greenspan monetary policy regime (1987:8-1999:12) compared to the entire in-sample 
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period. The reaction coefficient is large, and its standard error is also huge, which 
reflects the variation in the Fed's reaction to inflation. 
 
Table 2.3 
Long-run Taylor Rule 
Sample Period β  v  
1960:01-1999:12 0.900 (0.191) 2.701 (0.997) 
1987:08-1999:12 2.629 (0.861) -2.464 (2.934) 
Estimation model is as follows: .tttr ωβpiν ++= The standard errors are in the parentheses. 
 
 
Our model implies that the term structure information loses its predictability of 
inflation as the magnitude of reaction to inflation increases. At the same time, the 
parameter uncertainty is likely to lower the relevancy of the inflation forecasts based on 
the term structure information. 
Table 2.4 shows the results of testing for parameter stability of the long-run Taylor 
rule.  The test statistics  are based  on  the bivariate error correction model of  the federal  
 
Table 2.4 
Parameter Stability of the Long-run Taylor Rule 
 Ave-LM 5% c.v. Exp-LM 5% c.v. Sup-LM 5% c.v. 
β  1.086 2.71 3.46 2.02 17.283 9.09 
vectoradj.  7.343 4.61 10.824 3.22 28.761 11.79 
).,( vectoradjβ  8.429 6.08 13.524 4.25 36.247 14.23 
The 5% critical values are in the parentheses. 
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funds rate and the 12-month inflation rate for the sample period 1960:1-1999:12. The 
5% critical values are obtained from Seo (1998) for the stability of the long-run 
cointegrating vector and from Andrews (1993) for the stability of the adjustment vector. 
The parameter stability of the long-run reaction parameter can be rejected based on 
the Exp-LM and Sup-LM statistics. Although the Ave-LM statistic does not support 
parameter instability, Figure 2.3 shows that parameter instability increased in the mid 
1970s and reached the peak in the early 1980s. This result coincides with the period of 
the change in the operating system for which the volatility of the interest rate and 
inflation increased. After the mid 1980s, the LM statistics of the long-run reaction 
parameter became stabilized. Also, the parameter stability of the short-run adjustment 
vector can be rejected. We find parameter instability in the Fed's reaction to inflation. 
Parameter uncertainty may affect the relevancy of the inflation forecasts. 
Next, we compare the prediction accuracy of inflation forecasting models: random 
walk; forecasting with the term structure; and forecasting with the long-run Taylor rule 
and the term structure. 
Table 2.5 reports estimation results of the forecasting models. First, we estimate the 
forecasting model using the term structure. An intercept and four lagged values (k=4) of 
differenced inflation are augmented to estimate the forecasting model. For the sample 
period 1960:1-1999:12, the response of inflation to the term structure is significant 
although the term spread has the limited predictability of the change of inflation as the 
adjusted R-squared coefficient shows. However, for the period 1987:8-1999:12, the 
response of inflation to the term structure became negative and insignificant. 
  
25 
 
Panel A: Long-run reaction parameter 
 
Panel B: Adjustment coefficient 
 
Panel C: Joint test of long-run reaction parameter and adjustment coefficient 
 
Figure 2.3 Stability Tests of the Long-run Taylor Rule  
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Table 2.5 
Inflation Forecasting Model 
 tt rR −  ttr βpi−  2R  
1960:1-1999:12 0.393 (0.183)   0.078 
 0.426 (0.226) 0.035 (0.117) 0.077 
1987:8-1999:12 -0.187 (0.253)   0.009 
 -0.075 (0.233) 0.255 (0.071) 0.343 
The standard errors are in the parentheses. 
 
 
 Figure 2.4 depicts the relationship between inflation change and term spread, which 
supports the estimation results. As Figure 2.4 shows, the change in inflation is weakly 
related to the term spread for the entire in-sample period. However, this relationship 
disappeared in the Greenspan monetary policy regime. 
For the sample period 1960:1-1999:12, the long-run information of the Taylor rule is 
not significant as shown in Table 2.5. However, for the sample period 1987:8-1999:12, 
the predictability of the model with the long-run Taylor rule improves dramatically in 
terms of the adjusted R-squared coefficient compared to the forecasting model using the 
term spread only. The information of the long-run Taylor rule is calculated using the 
estimated reaction parameter. In addition, an intercept and four lagged values (k=4) of 
differenced inflation are augmented to estimate the model. While the term structure 
information is weak in the Greenspan monetary policy regime, the long-run Taylor rule 
exhibits a significant information effects. The change in inflation responds positively to 
the long-run Taylor rule. When the actual short-term rate is greater than the optimal 
target rate, the equilibrium process begins with an increase in inflation. Therefore, the 
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long-run Taylor rule provides information to predict the future change in inflation. 
Figure 2.5 displays the relationship between the change in inflation and the long-run 
Taylor rule. This relationship becomes evident for the Greenspan monetary policy 
regime.  
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Figure 2.4 Term Structure and Inflation Change 
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Figure 2.5 Taylor Rule and Inflation Change 
 
 
We examine the robustness of the predictive information in the long-run Taylor rule 
by using the different forms of inflation forecasting model. First, we consider the term 
structure of interest rates with different maturities. The term spread is defined as the 
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difference of the yields between the 10-year Treasury bond and 3-month Treasury bill. 
As Table 2.6 shows, the coefficient of the term spread has the negative sign and it is 
insignificant for the period 1960:1-1999:12. However, the long-run Taylor rule has a 
significant information effect in predicting the change in inflation for the Greenspan 
monetary policy regime. The similar results, which are not reported in the paper, are 
obtained for several choices of the term structure with different maturities. 
 
Table 2.6 
Inflation Forecasting Model with Different Term Structure 
 tt rR −  ttr βpi−  2R  
1960:1-1999:12 -0.066 (0.142)   0.046 
 -0.084 (0.139) -0.044 (0.112) 0.046 
1987:8-1999:12 -0.207 (0.095)   0.052 
  0.113 (0.157) 0.286 (0.088) 0.353 
The standard errors are in the parentheses. 
 
  
We also consider several macroeconomic variables in inflation forecasting model 
with the long-run Taylor rule and the term structure. As Table 2.7 shows, the coefficients 
of term structure and the Taylor rule do not appear to be seriously affected by the 
inclusion of macroeconomic variables. For the sample period 1960:1-1999:12, the 
coefficients of the macroeconomic variables such as unemployment rate, the change in 
industrial production, M2 growth, and the oil price change are significant in explaining 
the change in inflation. However, these macroeconomic variables become insignificant 
for the sample period 1987:8-1999:12.  
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Table 2.7 
Inflation Forecasting Model with Other Macro Variables 
Sample Period 1960:01-1999:12 1987:8-1999:12 
Term Structure  0.3646 (0.1686) -0.1757 (0.2498) 
Taylor Rule  0.0750 (0.0869)  0.3001 (0.0923) 
Unemployment -0.4118 (0.1003)  0.1389 (0.1629) 
IP Change  0.0536 (0.0124)  0.0022 (0.0126) 
M2 Growth  0.0745 (0.0315) -0.0043 (0.0316) 
S&P 500 Returns  0.0026 (0.0020) -0.0014 (0.0015) 
Oil Price Change  0.0021 (0.0008)  0.0013 (0.0009) 
2
R  0.270 0.347 
The standard errors are in the parentheses. 
     
 
Table 2.8 summarizes the predictive accuracy of inflation forecasting models. The 
random walk model is treated as the reference model. The inflation forecasts using the 
long-run Taylor rule and the term structure achieve an improvement in the predictive 
accuracy by 4.55% in terms of the RMSE compared to the random walk model for the 
sample period 1960:1-1999:12. The MAE decreases by 2.02% for the same period. On 
the other hand, for the sample period 1987:8-1999:12, the inflation forecasts using the 
long-run Taylor rule show an improvement in the prediction accuracy by 20.62% in 
terms of the RMSE relative to the random walk model while the term structure 
information reveals 2.14% gain. Therefore, the inflation forecasts using long-run Taylor 
rule information show an improvement in the prediction accuracy relative to the 
forecasts using the term structure only.  
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Table 2.8 
Forecasting Accuracy 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 B/A C/A 
  (=A) (=B) (=C)   
In-Sample forecasting 
1960:1-1999:12 RMSE 1.8746 1.7906 1.7893 0.9552 0.9545 
 MAE 1.3689 1.3430 1.3412 0.9811 0.9798 
1987:8-1999:12 RMSE 0.9609 0.9403 0.7627 0.9786 0.7938 
 MAE 0.7029 0.7034 0.6199 1.0007 0.8819 
Out-of-Sample forecasting 
1960:1-1999:12 RMSE 1.2036 1.2704 1.2803 1.0554 1.0637 
 MAE 1.0181 1.0977 1.1133 1.0782 1.0934 
1987:8-1999:12 RMSE 1.1914 1.1295 1.0568 0.9481 0.8871 
 MAE 1.0307 0.9640 0.9059 0.9353 0.8790 

=
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Table 2.8 also shows the prediction accuracy of the out-of-sample forecasts for the 
period 2000:1-2004:12. The forecasts are calculated recursively with a start-up sample 
period of 1960:1-1999:12 and 1987:8-1999:12. Given the start-up sample period 1960:1-
1999:12, the out-of-sample inflation forecasts do not show any improvement regardless 
of the information about the term structure and the long-run Taylor rule. However, given 
the start-up sample period 1987:8-1999:12, the out-of-sample inflation forecasts using 
the long-run Taylor rule and the term structure achieve a significant improvement in the 
predictive accuracy by 11.29% measured by the RMSE while the out-of-sample 
forecasts using the term structure only improves 5.19% compared to the random walk 
model. Considering parameter instability in the monetary policy rules, this evidence is 
quite noteworthy. As the parameter in the monetary policy rules becomes more stable, 
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the inflation forecasts using the long-run Taylor rule are likely to generate more accurate 
prediction of inflation. 
    
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we investigate the influence of the monetary policy rules on the 
prediction of inflation. Our analysis finds that the prediction performance of the term 
structure model hinges on the monetary policy rules, which involve the manipulation of 
the federal funds rate in response to the change in the price level. As the Fed's reaction to 
inflation becomes stronger, the predictive information contained in the term structure 
becomes weaker. Using the long-run Taylor rule, a new assessment of the prediction 
performance regarding future change in inflation is provided. The empirical results 
indicate that the long-run Taylor rule improves forecasting accuracy. The rational 
expectations model cannot explain this linkage, and thus this study resolves the 
discordance between economic theory and empirical findings. 
We extended our analysis to the model with other macroeconomic variables. The 
information of economic indicators tends to be less important as the central bank shows 
strong commitment to the inflation. However, the information of the monetary policy 
rules, if strong, can be used for predicting the future path of inflation.      
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CHAPTER III 
IS THE PREFERENCE OF CENTRAL BANK ASYMMETRY? 
EVIDENCE FROM KOREA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
There are a number of studies that have investigated the optimal monetary policy or 
the monetary policy rules under the assumption that the preferences of the central banks 
are symmetric over key macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and output. Usually 
they employ the standard linear-quadratic framework which consists of central banks’ 
quadratic loss function and a linear aggregate supply function and/or a linear demand 
function. This quadratic (symmetric) preference means that the central banks have 
weighted the same amount of loss both on positive deviations of inflation (output) from 
target (trend) and on negative ones of the same size. This linear-quadratic framework 
leads to a linear reaction function or Taylor rule type function which is the first order 
condition of the optimization of central banks’ problem.  
However, recently a growing number of papers have questioned this quadratic 
preference assumption: specifically, are negative deviations of inflation from target as 
undesirable as positive deviations of inflation from target of the same amount? And/or 
are positive output gaps as distasteful as negative output gaps of the same size?  Nobay 
and Peel (2003), Ruge-Murcia (2002), Surcio (2003a), and Karagedikli and Lees (2004) 
relax the assumption of the quadratic preference of central banks and adopt instead 
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asymmetric preference specifications. This asymmetric loss function generally leads to a 
nonlinear reaction function or monetary policy rule which is the first order condition 
solved for the optimization problem of central banks with a linear aggregate supply 
function. Whether the central bank has the asymmetric objective function is an important 
issue since many of the results on the time consistency problem under symmetric 
preferences may no longer hold under asymmetric preferences as shown in Nobay and 
Peel (2003), and Surcio (2003a). 
In principle the preference of central banks can be inferred from their monetary 
policy reaction function. However, a nonlinear monetary policy reaction function can 
also be derived from a nonlinear aggregate supply curve. Therefore, Surcio (2003b), 
Dolado et al. (2004) studied central banks’ asymmetric preference with a nonlinear 
aggregate supply curve. They tried to estimate the asymmetric preferences of central 
banks controlling the nonlinear component coming from the nonlinear aggregate supply 
curve.  
Recently the way of conducting monetary policy in Korea was changed dramatically. 
After the Bank of Korea Act revised in April 1998, the inflation targeting was adopted as 
new monetary policy system. In addition the Bank of Korea (i.e., BOK), which is the 
central bank in Korea, uses interest rate - the overnight call rate - as its monetary policy 
instrument instead of monetary aggregates such as reserves, and M2. Table 3.1 shows 
the change of the target interest rate in the period from 1999 to 2005. This institutional 
change has stimulated Taylor rule type monetary policy analysis of the Bank of Korea. 
For example, Eichengreen (2004) analyzed the monetary and exchange rate policy of the 
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Bank of Korea by estimating the Taylor type monetary policy rule. Since the Bank of 
Korea has set up the explicit inflation target from 1998, the study on its asymmetric 
preference of inflation will have an advantage over assuming the implicit inflation target 
frequently used for the non-inflation targeting countries, for example United States.  
 
Table 3.1 
The Change of the Target Interest Rates 
Date of change   The target rate (%) The change (%) 
1999 May 6  4.75 - 
2000 February 10  5.00 +0.25 
 October 5  5.25 +0.25 
2001 February 8  5.00 -0.25 
 July 5  4.75 -0.25 
 August 9  4.50 -0.25 
 September 19  4.00 -0.25 
2002 May 7  4.25 +0.25 
2003 May 13  4.00 -0.25 
 July 10  3.75 -0.25 
2004 August 12  3.50 -0.25 
 November 11  3.25 -0.25 
2005 October 11  3.50 +0.25 
 December 8  3.75 +0.25 
Sources are the Bank of Korea. 
 
 
Most of studies about the asymmetric preference of central banks are concentrated on 
the developed countries. Also empirical results are not conclusive on asymmetric 
preference of central banks so that they are dependent on the countries and the sample 
period studied. However, to the best of my knowledge still there is no study of the 
asymmetric preference of the central bank of Korea.  
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This chapter investigates the monetary policy preference of the central bank in Korea 
during the inflation targeting period: 1998:9-2005:12. We are trying to answer the 
question whether the preferences for inflation or/and output gap of the central bank in 
Korea are asymmetry, and specifically the BOK has a precautionary demand for 
inflation or/and for expansions. 2  The contribution of this paper is to provide some 
evidence supporting that the preference of central banks may not be symmetric over 
inflation but over output gap, and therefore it adds another empirical result to the 
literature of asymmetric preferences of central banks.    
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the new 
Keynesian economy and the asymmetric objective function of central bank along line of 
Surcio (2003b), etc. Under this framework, we derive the optimal reaction function 
which serves as a benchmark for the empirical section. The empirical results are 
provided in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 concludes. 
 
3.2 The Model 
 
3.2.1 The Economy 
 
In this chapter we adopt the new Keynesian framework as an economy in which 
inflation and output gap depend on the expected future values of those variables 
respectively and in which the policy instrument of the central bank is the nominal 
                                                 
2
 Cukierman and Muscatelli (2003) call it the situation that when policy makers are uncertain the state of 
the economy, they might respond more aggressively to negative output gaps than to positive ones. 
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interest rate. This simple model has been popularized for use in monetary policy 
literature after Clarida et al. (1999), Woodford (1999, 2001), McCallum and Nelson 
(1999) and Svensson and Woodford (1997, 2003), etc. Specifically the economy can be 
specified by the following two equation system corresponding to an aggregate demand 
and to an aggregate supply relation, respectively: 
                                   ,)(~~ 11 dttttttt eEiyEy +−−= ++ piα                                             (3.1) 
                                  ,)~(1 sttttt eyFE ++= +piωpi                                                       (3.2) 
where 
                                ).~1/(~)~( ttt yyyF βψβ −=                                                            (3.3) 
ty~  is the output gap and tpi  is the inflation rate, 1~ +tt yE  and 1+ttE pi  are the expected values 
of those variables conditioned on the information available at period t, ti  is the nominal 
rate of interest, and 0>α , 0>ω , 0>β  and 0≥ψ  are parameters. The demand 
disturbance, ,dte and the cost disturbance, 
s
te , are assumed to follow a zero mean 
reverting process. Equation (3.1) is represented by a linear approximation to the 
representative household’s Euler condition for optimal consumption. It basically 
postulates a forward-looking IS relationship where the output gap depends on the 
expected output gap and the real interest rate, 1+− ttt Ei pi . Equation (3.2) is derived under 
assumption of monopolistic competition, with individual firms adjusting prices in a 
staggered, overlapping fashion. Also it is a forward-looking AS relationship where 
inflation depends on expected inflation and output gap. The relation of inflation and 
output gap in equation (3.2) is represented by general functional form, )~( tyF  since it is 
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able to introduce a nonlinear relation. The nonlinearity in AS curve is specified by 
equation (3.3). This functional form has been used previously by Schaling (2004), 
Dolado et al. (2005), and Surcio (2003b), and Dolado, et al (2004), etc., because it can 
be a linear or a nonlinear AS curve depending on the value of the parameter (ψ ) 
represented the degree of nonlinearity. 3  If the parameter is zero (i.e., 0=ψ ), then the 
AS curve turns into the standard linear relation. But if the parameter is positive (i.e., 
0>ψ ), the relation is a nonlinear one as it allows the slope of the aggregate supply 
curve to be steeper at a higher level of inflation and output gap. It can be justified by the 
presence of a capacity constraint or some menu costs, downward wage rigidity, etc. 
 
3.2.2 Policy Objectives of Central Banks 
 
Following the literature, it is assumed that the central bank is trying to minimize the 
expected value of a loss function that depends on inflation, output, and interest rate.  
                                             ,
0
1}{ jt
j
j
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∞
=
− δ                                                   (3.4) 
where 10 << δ  is the discount factor of central bank and tV  is the period loss function. 
The loss function is assumed to take the following linear-exponential (i.e., linex) form 
for inflation and output gap: 
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3
 It can be possible for the parameter to be negative (i.e., 0<ψ ). This means that the relation between 
inflation and output gap is concave, but this case seems to be against the reality. 
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where *pi is target inflation rate and g  is average (or target) of interest rate change.4 The 
parameters θ and A  are strictly positive and govern the relative weight that central bank 
places on output and interest rate stabilization relative to inflation stabilization, 
respectively. The parameter ϕ  represents the degree of asymmetry with respect to 
inflation, while the parameter φ  stands for that with respect to output gap. 
The loss function in here is different with Surcio (2003b) in that we use 
2
1)( −− tt ii instead of 2*)( iit −  where *i is target rate.5 This type of objective is used in 
Svensson (2000). This change has some interesting theoretical and empirical aspects. 
First, this loss function reflects the fact that the central bank control interest rate toward 
target rate almost perfectly as shown in Figure 3.1. Therefore, the loss from deviation 
from previous interest rate might be more important than the loss from deviation from 
the target rate in central bank’s standpoint of view. Second, Surcio (2003b) transformed 
the reaction function derived from the FOC ad hoc when the partial adjustment behavior 
of interest rate introduced. However, in here we formally incorporate the adjustment cost 
into the period loss function. Last, the nominal interest rates show the highly persistent 
property in this sample period.6 The possibility of spurious regression can be avoided 
since the reaction function derived from this objective is made of the change of interest 
rate as shown in Section 3.2.3.  
                                                 
4
 In other papers such as Svensson (2000) g is implicitly assumed to zero. In here it is introduced because 
first, it is more general and second, it make the monetary policy reaction function have a constant term. 
But as shown in empirical results constant term is not significant statistically. 
5
 For the robustness, the monetary policy reaction function used in Surcio (2003b) derived and its 
estimating results are reported in Appendix. 
6
 For the sample period-1998:9-2005:12 the ADF test can not reject the hypothesis of unit roots in all three 
different specifications, but this results depend on the sample period.   
  
40 
 
3
4
5
6
7
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
call rate
target rate
 
Figure 3.1 Observed and Target Call Rate   
 
 
The linex functional form in equation (3.5) is frequently used in recent asymmetric 
optimal monetary policy literature, including Nobay and Peel (2003), Surcio (2003a, 
2003b), Ruge-Murcia (2003) and Karagedikli and Lees (2004) etc., since it gives 
direction on the type of asymmetric preferences that serve as the metric to evaluate 
alternative monetary policies. Also the linex functional form nests the quadratic form as 
a special case, i.e., using L’Hopital’s rule and differentiating twice with respect to 
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0== φϕ , the conventional quadratic form, 2122* )(2
~
2
)(
2
1 giiAyV ttttt −−++−= −
θ
pipi  
could be recovered. 7  If ϕ  (φ ) is not zero, then the linex function weighs differently 
with respect to positive and negative deviations of inflation from target (output gaps). 
For example, if 0>ϕ , positive deviations of inflation from target are more costly than 
negative ones since the exponential term dominates the linear term in equation (3.5), 
while when 0<ϕ , negative deviations of inflation from target are more costly than 
positive ones because the linear term dominates the exponential term. As a same token, 
if 0<φ , negative output gaps are more costly than positive ones, while positive output 
gaps are more costly than negative one when 0>φ . 
 
3.2.3 A Monetary Policy Reaction Function 
 
The time frame of monetary policy making is that the interest rate has to be chosen 
before the realization of economic shocks is known with certainty to policy maker. This 
means that the innovations dte and 
s
te are unknown at the time policy maker choose the 
nominal interest rate ti . Also under discretion the policy maker takes expectations of 
future variables as given. Therefore, the problem of the policy maker is to choose the 
current interest rates and the sequence of future interest rates such as to minimize 
following function subject to the behavior of the economy:      
                                                 
7
 For example, 
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                                           ttt fiy +−= α~  ,                                                               (3.7) 
                                          ,)~1/(~ tttt gyy +−= βψβpi                                                 (3.8) 
where jt
j
j
tt VES +
∞
=
− ≡
2
1 δ , dtttttt eEyEf ++≡ ++ 11~ piα  and stttt eEh +≡ +1piω stand for the 
components of the model the monetary policy makers cannot control since they are not 
able to manipulate expectations directly.  
The first order condition (FOC) for minimizing the loss of central bank is given by 
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Based on above equation, we can derive the various FOC specifications by combining 
different nonlinearity conditions. For example, when the condition 0=== ψφϕ  is 
imposed, the FOC (3.9) reduces to the following linear condition:  
         .0)()(~)( 1111*1 =−−−−−+−−− +−−−− giiAEgiiAyEE ttttttttt δθαpipiαβ      (3.10)    
Also this equation can be derived directly from quadratic objective function of central 
bank and a linear system of the economy.  
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Now we proceed to an empirical specification. Equation (3.9) cannot be estimated 
directly since the equation is not linear in the parameters. Therefore, by taking the first 
order Taylor series expansion at 0=== ψφϕ , the exponential terms and inverse 
function in equation (3.9) is approximated,8 and then it can be written as   
            
2
1
2*
11
*
1
~
2
)(
2
~)( tttttttt yEEyEE −−−− −−−−−−
φθα
pipi
ϕαβθαpipiαβ  
          ,0)()(]~)[(2 111*12 =+−−−−−+−− +−−− ttttttttt giiAEgiiAyE εδpipiψαβ     (3.11) 
where tε  represents the higher order of the Taylor series expansion. Solving for ti∆  and 
the expected inflation, output gap and interest rate change are replaced by actual values, 
then the nonlinear monetary policy reaction function can be written as follows:9 
                  ,)~~(~~~~ 524232101 tttttttt uycyccycccii t +++++++∆=∆ + pipipiδ                   (3.12) 
which is linear in the coefficients, and for simplicity *pipi −t  is defined as tpi~  which 
stands for deviation of inflation from target or inflation gap. Also we get the following 
coefficients and error term condition related with equation (3.11) and (3.12):               
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 The Taylor series expansions of exponential function and inverse function follow: 
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 If we recursively solve equation (12) forward to yield    
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The change of nominal interest rate depends on the discount value of future inflation gaps and output gaps 
and forecasting errors.  
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The error term is a linear combination of forecast errors and thus orthogonal to any 
variable in the information set available at t-1. Therefore, based on this orthogonality 
condition, the parameters in equation (3.12) can be estimated by the generalized method 
of moments (GMM). From the reduced coefficients, we can recover the asymmetric 
preferences over inflation gap and output gap such as 13 /2 cc=ϕ , and 24 /2 cc=φ . 
However, two parameters of the weight on output gap relative to inflation (θ ) and the 
degree of nonlinear in AS curve (ψ  ) are not recovered without knowing the parameter 
β  in AS curve. The focus of this paper is to estimate the asymmetric preference 
parameters and tests whether those are statistically different with zero. Therefore, in here 
we do not try to recover ψ  and just use the cross-product term as a control variable. In 
empirical aspect, we try to estimate the preference parameters in various specifications 
using the combination of nonlinearity conditions. For example, we can estimate equation 
(3.12) assuming either a linear or nonlinear AS curve. 
 
3.3 Empirical Results 
 
3.3.1 Data 
 
In the empirical analysis, we use the monthly data for overnight call rate, yield of 5-
year government bond, consumer price index (CPI), core consumer price index (core 
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CPI) and industrial production index (IPI), which are obtained from the Bank of Korea's 
Economic Statistics System.10 The 12 month inflation rate is calculated based on CPI or 
core CPI. That is, ,100)log(log 12 ×−= −ttt PPpi where tP  is CPI or core CPI. Beginning 
the inflation targeting, the target was formed in terms of CPI. However, from year 2000, 
this was changed in terms of the core CPI which excluded certain non-grain agricultural 
products11 and petroleum products from CPI. Therefore, we call the inflation based on 
CPI as CPI inflation, and the inflation based on core CPI since year 2000 as core 
inflation. As show in Figure 3.2, two inflation series moved similarly. But core inflation 
is more stable than CPI inflation. The target inflation is obtained from the published 
figures of the Bank of Korea, 12 and using it CPI and core inflation gaps are calculated as 
shown in Figure 3.3. Output gap series are constructed from the seasonally adjusted IPI 
using a quadratic trend method over 1998:1-2005:12. More specifically, output gap is 
measured as the actual output’s percentage deviation from the trend output: 
,100}/){(~ ** ×−= qqqyt  where q  and *q  are respectively the actual output and the 
trend output which are shown in Figure 3.4. Also the estimated output gap series are 
shown in Figure 3.5. 
The sample is from 1998:4 to 2005:12. Since first five observations are used for 
central bank’s information set, the actual sample used for estimating the reaction 
function of the central bank of Korea is 1998:9-2005:12. The descriptive statistics of the 
variables considered here are summarized in Table 3.2.  
                                                 
10
 http://ecos.bok.or.kr/. 
11
 Those consist of vegetables, fruits and other agricultural products.  
12
 The inflation targets used in here are the middle figure of the range since the Bank of Korea publishes 
the target as a target range such as 2-4%. 
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Figure 3.2 Annual CPI and Core Inflation 
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Figure 3.3 Annual CPI and Core Inflation Gaps 
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Figure 3.4 Actual Output and Estimated Output Trend Series  
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Figure 3.5 Estimated Output Gap Series 
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Table 3.2 
Descriptive Statistics     
 Call rate Output gap Inflation 
   CPI Core Target 
Mean 4.430 0.558 2.926 2.641 3.205 
Standard deviation 0.980 4.618 1.305 1.194 1.283 
Sample period is from 1998:9 to 2005:12. CPI inflation is annual inflation rate calculated on consumer 
price index, while core inflation is calculated based on CPI until 1999:12 but after that based on Core CPI. 
Output gap is estimated using a quadratic trend.  
 
 
3.3.2 Estimation Results 
 
We estimate the equation (3.12) using the GMM, while a constant and five lags of 
inflation, output gap, call rate and the long-short interest rate spread13 are included as 
instruments. Table 3.3 reports the results of estimating several reaction functions that 
allow for only an asymmetric response to inflation gap or/and the output gap, and also 
with/without a nonlinear AS curve when core inflation is used for central bank’s target 
inflation. Over various specifications the estimates of the discounting factor of the Bank 
of Korea are all significant and are ranged from 0.835 to 0.92314, which are relatively 
small number compared to the subjective rate of time discount in utility function of 
representative household generally used in standard real-business-cycle literature.15  
 
                                                 
13
 The long-short interest spread is constructed from yields of 5-year government bond and overnight call 
rate. 
14
 If those values are converted into annual ones, then they are corresponding to 0.115 and 0.382, 
respectively. 
15
 Walsh (2003) used the subjective rate of time discount in utility function as 0.989 for quarterly data (p. 
75). This value is corresponding to 0.9567 for annual data. For monthly data the discount factor 0.996 is 
close to the corresponding annual discount rate. 
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Table 3.3 
Reduced Form Estimates of Reaction Function 
Model δ  0c  1c  2c  3c  4c  5c  J 2R  
Panel A: Linear reaction function 
(1) 0.855** 0.006 0.023** 0.005** - - - 0.138 0.498 
 (0.026) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)      
Panel B: Nonlinear reaction function with inflation gap only 
(2) 0.849** 0.010+ 0.049** 0.006** 0.011 - - 0.136 0.523 
 (0.031) (0.005) (0.015) (0.002) (0.007)     
          
(3) 0.835** 0.009+ 0.042** 0.005 0.008 - -0.001 0.136 0.513 
 (0.047) (0.005) (0.016) (0.003) (0.008)  (0.003)   
Panel C: Nonlinear reaction function with output gap only 
(4) 0.923** 0.005 0.024** 0.003+ - 0.0003 - 0.135 0.454 
 (0.047) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002)  (0.0003)    
          
(5) 0.865** 0.003 0.024** -0.006 - 0.0005 -0.007+ 0.120 0.415 
 (0.042) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)  (0.0004) (0.004)   
Panel D: Nonlinear reaction function with inflation gap and output gap 
(6) 0.923** 0.010+ 0.050** 0.004+ 0.012+ 0.0003 - 0.133 0.482 
 (0.059) (0.006) (0.015) (0.002) (0.007) (0.0003)    
          
(7) 0.882** 0.007 0.045* -0.006 0.009 0.0006 -0.007 0.122 0.442 
 (0.055) (0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.009) (0.0004) (0.005)   
Estimation model is as follows: tttttttt uycyccycccii t +++++++∆=∆ + )~~(~~~~ 524232101 pipipiδ . The 
estimation period is from 1998:9 to 2005:12. Output gap is obtained from percentage change of actual and 
detrending industrial production index with quadratic trend equation for the sample period 1998:1-2005:12. 
The instrument sets include constant and five lags of core inflation, output gap, long-short interest rate 
spread and call rate. The superscript **, * and + denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true 
coefficient is zero at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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Another interesting fact is that when the cross-product term of inflation gap and 
output gap is specified in the reaction function, its coefficient has wrong sign, but 
marginally significant under asymmetry assumption over only output gap. Also the 
estimated coefficients of output gap become insignificant and they have wrong sign in 2 
times out of 3 models.  
Panel A in Table 3.3 reports the estimation results of the baseline linear reaction 
function which can be obtained by imposing the condition 0654 === ccc  on equation 
(3.12). The coefficients of inflation and output gap are significant at 1 percent 
significance level. However, it appears that central bank of Korea was more aggressive 
toward inflation than output since the coefficient of inflation gap is 4 times bigger than 
that of output gap. Next, we consider the Bank of Korea’s asymmetric preferences over 
inflation gap only with/without assuming a linear AS curve (i.e., 04 =c , or 0=φ ). Panel 
B depicts estimation results for a nonlinear response to deviations of inflation from 
target. First, if we consider a linear AS curve, the square of deviations of inflation from 
target is positive but not marginally significant at 10% significance level. Second, when 
the nonlinear AS curve is considered in the model, the coefficients of output gap become 
insignificant and also the fitness of the model is worse in term of adjusted 2R compared 
to the model with a linear AS curve.  In Panel C the estimation results considered only 
an asymmetry over output gap are reported. The square of output gap is positive but not 
significant regardless of the AS curve, so it indicates that the preference of the Bank of 
Korea is not asymmetric over output. Finally, when the possibility of asymmetric 
preferences over both inflation gap and output gap is considered which is more general 
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specification (Panel D), the squares of inflation gap and output gap are not significant 
with the cross term of inflation gap and output gap. But when the cross term of inflation 
gap and output gap is dropped, then only the square of inflation gap is significant at 10% 
significance level.  Those results seem to be for the hypothesis that the central bank of 
Korea may response asymmetrically to inflation gap but not to output gap. 
However, before jumping to the conclusion we need to test statistically whether the 
asymmetry parameters are zero. In this end, we estimate the following equation for 
obtaining the asymmetric parameters and their standard deviations, and so we can test 
their significance statistically16: 
   .)~~(}~~)/2{(}~~)/2{( 62201 tttttttt uycyybaacii t +++++++∆=∆ + piφφφpipiϕϕδ        (3.13) 
Note that this equation is the same with equation (3.12) mathematically. This means that 
the estimation results should be same with Table 3.3, which is the result of estimating 
equation (3.12). Table 3.4 reports the estimated parameters of central bank’s asymmetric 
preferences under various specifications. The asymmetry parameter over inflation gap is 
significant at 1% significance level when the AS curve is linear. The estimated 
parameter when considered both inflation gap and output gap is 0.483, which is very 
close with that when considered only inflation gap. Thus the Bank of Korea appears to 
possess asymmetric preferences with regard to the inflation gap, and since its sign is 
positive, we can infer that the Bank of Korea is out-weighting positive deviations of 
inflation  from  its target than negative ones in its loss function.  However,  the estimated 
                                                 
16
 Although the parameters of asymmetric preferences can be recovered from estimated coefficients of the 
reaction function using the relationship as 13 /2 cc=ϕ  and 24 /2 cc=φ , the equation (13) should be 
estimated in order to test the significance of asymmetry parameters statistically. Different forms can also 
be used for this end.   
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Table 3.4 
Estimates of the Asymmetric Policy Preferences  
Model  Inflation gap (ϕ ) Output gap (γ ) J 2R  
Panel A: Inflation gap only 
(2)  0.464** - 0.136 0.522 
  (0.161)    
      
(3)  0.385 - 0.136 0. 513 
  (0.231)    
Penal B: Output gap only 
(4)  - 0.176 0.135 0.454 
   (0.210)   
      
(5)  - -0.174 0.120 0.415 
   (0.112)   
Panel C: Inflation gap and output gap 
(6)  0.483** 0.147 0.133 0.482 
  (0.157) (0.212)   
      
(7)  0.411+ -0.198 0.122 0.442 
  (0.238) (0.145)   
Estimation model is as follows: .)~~(}~~)/2{(}~~)/2{( 524423301 tttttttt uycycyccccii t +++++++∆=∆ + piφφpipiϕϕδ  The 
estimation period is from 1998:9 to 2005:12. Output gap is obtained from percentage change of actual and 
detrending industrial production index with quadratic trend equation for the sample period 1998:1-2005:12.  
The instrument sets include constant and five lags of core inflation, output gap, long-short interest rate 
spread and call rate. The superscript **, * and + denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true 
coefficient is zero at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
asymmetric parameters over output gap have relatively small values and their sign 
depends on existence of the cross term. However, the preference parameters are not 
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significant at conventional significance level in all specification. Therefore, estimating 
results of asymmetric preference with regard to output gap seems to be against the 
asymmetric hypothesis. 
In sum, this empirical evidence supports that while the preference over output of 
central bank of Korea is symmetry, but that over inflation is not symmetry. Specifically 
the bank responds aggressively positive inflation gaps compared to negative inflation 
gaps. This positive asymmetric preference over inflation can induce deflation bias, 
which is not big because the size of parameter is relatively small. Figure 3.6 graphs the 
estimated asymmetric preference over inflation gap compared to the standard quadratic 
representation assuming 483.0=ϕ . Note that since asymmetric parameter estimate over 
inflation gap is relatively small, the loss from inflation gaps is underweighted compared 
to that of the standard quadratic specification regardless of its sign.  
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
-3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Deviation from inflation target
Lo
ss
Quadractic(=0)
Asymmetric(=0.483)
 
 
Figure 3.6 Asymmetric Preferences with Respect to Inflation of the Bank of Korea 
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3.3.3 Robustness Tests 
 
The estimated discount factor in equation (3.12) is relatively small compared to the 
value normally assumed for representative household as discussed in Section 3.3.2, 
although the discount factor of central bank necessarily need not to be same with that of 
household. For the robustness, in here we re-estimate the reaction function by imposing 
some specific number of the discount factor on equation (3.12).  Table 3.5 shows the 
estimation results when the restriction 996.0=δ is imposed. It is not surprising that the 
fitness of the model is deteriorated compared to the results in Table 3.3.  One interesting 
thing is that the square of output gap becomes significant statistically although the 
estimated coefficients are very small. While the square of inflation gap also becomes 
significant statistically, some coefficients of inflation gap also become significant. When 
asymmetric preferences over inflation and output considered, the cross term of inflation 
gap and output gap is not significant statistically. However, the square terms of inflation 
gap and output gap are significant at the standard significance level in model 6. The 
estimation results of asymmetry parameters assuming 996.0=δ  are reported in Table 
3.6. The estimated asymmetric preference parameter over only inflation gap is statically 
significant regardless of function form of an AS curve as shown in Panel A. However, as 
reported in Panel B, if asymmetric preference over only output gap considered, the 
estimated preference parameter over output gap is not significant statistically.  Finally, 
when asymmetric preferences over both inflation gap  and output gap are specified in the 
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Table 3.5 
Reduced Form Estimates of Reaction Function - 996.0=δ  
Model δ  0c  1c  2c  3c  4c  5c  J 2R  
Panel A: Linear reaction function 
(1) 0.996 0.012+ 0.022** 0.003+ - - - 0.150 0.454 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.002)      
Panel B: Nonlinear reaction function with inflation gap only 
(2) 0.996 0.022** 0.091** 0.005** 0.030** - - 0.154 0.504 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.004)     
          
(3) 0.996 0.012* 0.041** 0.010** 0.012* - 0.006** 0.141 0.458 
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.002)   
Panel C: Nonlinear reaction function with output gap only 
(4) 0.996 0.004 0.020** 0.001 - 0.0005** - 0.132 0.421 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.001)  (0.0002)    
          
(5) 0.996 -0.0002 0.021* -0.007 - 0.0009* -0.006 0.121 0.365 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.0004) (0.005)   
Panel D: Nonlinear reaction function with inflation gap and output gap 
(6) 0.996 0.010+ 0.053** 0.002 0.014* 0.0005** - 0.131 0.452 
  (0.006) (0.014) (0.001) (0.006) (0.0002)    
          
(7) 0.996 0.010 0.063** -0.008 0.018+ 0.0009* -0.006 0.122 0.420 
  (0.007) (0.020) (0.008) (0.009) (0.0004) (0.005)   
Estimation model is as follows: tttttttt uycyccycccii t +++++++∆=∆ + )~~(~~~~ 524232101 pipipiδ . The 
estimation period is from 1998:9 to 2005:12. Output gap is obtained from percentage change of actual and 
detrending industrial production index with quadratic trend equation for the sample period 1998:1-2005:12.  
The instrument sets include constant and five lags of core inflation, output gap, long-short interest rate 
spread and call rate. The superscript **, * and + denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true 
coefficient is zero at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.6 
Estimates of the Asymmetric Policy Preferences - 996.0=δ  
Model  Inflation gap (ϕ ) Output gap (γ ) J 2R  
Panel A: Inflation gap only 
(2)  0.667** - 0.154 0.504 
  (0.040)    
      
(3)  0.579** - 0.141 0. 458 
  (0.125)    
Panel B: Output gap only 
(4)  - 1.035 0.132 0.421 
   (1.295)   
      
(5)  - -0.238 0.121 0.365 
   (0.157)   
Panel C: Inflation gap and output gap  
(6)  0.538** 0.672 0.131 0.452 
  (0.134) (0.517)   
      
(7)  0.565** -0.242 0.122 0.420 
  (0.142) (0.170)   
Estimation model is as follows:
.)~~(}~~)/2{(}~~)/2{( 524423301 tttttttt uycycyccccii t +++++++∆=∆ + piφφpipiϕϕδ  
The estimation period is from 1998:9 to 2005:12. Output gap is obtained from percentage change of actual 
and detrending industrial production index with quadratic trend equation for the sample period 1998:1-
2005:12. The instrument sets include constant and five lags of core inflation, output gap, long-short 
interest rate spread and call rate. The superscript **, * and + denote the rejection of the null hypothesis 
that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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model, the asymmetric parameter over inflation gap is significant and positive regardless 
of functional form of an AS curve.  But asymmetric parameter over output gap is not 
significant. Generally this result is consistent with that discussed in Section 3.3.2. 
Although the central bank of Korea changed its target inflation as core inflation from 
CPI inflation since 2000, they might still care about the CPI inflation. Therefore, 
whether the asymmetric preference of central bank over inflation gap is robust to the 
change of targeted inflation is tested.  Table 3.7 reports the results of estimating the 
reaction function using CPI inflation instead of core inflation. The cross term of inflation 
gap and output gap is not significant in all 3 specifications. With a linear AS curve the 
square terms of inflation gap and output gap are significant statistically. This result 
supports that the preference over inflation gap is still nonlinear. However, the preference 
over output gap also might be nonlinear, which is different with the results when core 
inflation is used.17 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The central bank of Korea has been adopted explicit inflation targets since 1998. 
Therefore, this provides the interesting environment for testing whether the preferences 
of the Bank of Korea are consistent with the quadratic preference assumption that is 
standard  within the monetary policy literature. Using linear-exponential function instead  
                                                 
17
 In here the results of estimating the asymmetric preferences over inflation gap or/and output gap are not 
reported because some results of estimating equation (3.13) do not converged into those of estimating 
equation (3.12). 
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Table 3.7 
Reduced Form Estimates of Reaction Function – CPI Inflation  
Model δ  0c  1c  2c  3c  4c  5c  J 2R  
Penal A: Linear reaction function 
(1) 0.863** -0.001 0.016** 0.005** - - - 0.148 0.497 
 (0.027) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)      
Panel B: Nonlinear reaction function with inflation gap only 
(2) 0.887** -0.014* 0.052** 0.007** 0.025** - - 0.149 0.480 
 (0.037) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003)     
          
(3) 0.847** -0.019* 0.059** 0.006* 0.030** - -0.002 0.150 0.484 
 (0.049) (0.008) (0.012) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.002)   
Panel C: Nonlinear reaction function with output gap only 
(4) 0.517** -0.002 0.011+ 0.016** - -0.0014** - 0.137 0.614 
 (0.071) (0.005) (0.007) (0.002)  (0.0003)    
          
(5) 0.871** -0.006 0.013+ 0.0003 - 0.0002 -0.003 0.146 0.470 
 (0.041) (0.006) (0.007) (0.0004)  (0.0004) (0.003)   
Panel D: Nonlinear reaction function with inflation gap and output gap 
(6) 0.726** -0.015* 0.054** 0.012** 0.026** -0.0006*     - 0.154 0.524 
 (0.075) (0.007) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0003)    
          
(7) 0.532** 0.005 0.005 0.009* -0.009 -0.0009+ -0.004 0.119 0.532 
 (0.076) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.0005) (0.003)   
Estimation model is as follows: .)~~(~~~~ 524232101 tttttttt uycyccycccii t +++++++∆=∆ + pipipiδ  The 
estimation period is from 1998:9 to 2005:12. Output gap is obtained from percentage change of actual and 
detrending industrial production index with quadratic trend equation for the sample period 1998:1-2005:12.  
The instrument sets include constant and five lags of CPI inflation, output gap, long-short interest rate 
spread and call rate. The superscript **, * and + denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true 
coefficient is zero at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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of the standard quadratic function this paper examines the asymmetric preference of the 
Bank of Korea with regard to inflation gap and output gap under the new Keynesian 
economic framework. Under this framework, the nonlinear monetary policy reaction 
function is derived from the optimization behavior of central bank to minimize its loss. 
In addition, we introduce the possibility that AS curve is not linear, which also induces 
the nonlinear monetary reaction function. 
We estimate the reaction function and then recover the asymmetric preference 
parameter over inflation gap and output gap of the Bank of Korea in sample 1998:9-
2005:12. In summery, with caution we conclude that the AS curve may not be nonlinear 
form because the cross-product term of inflation gap and output gap is not significant 
and its sign is wrong. Second, with a linear AS curve the Bank of Korea have an 
asymmetric preference over inflation gap but not output gap. Third, since the sign of the 
preference parameter is positive, it appears that the BOK has the more weight on 
positive deviations of inflation from target than on negative ones, which supports the 
hypothesis of precautionary demand for inflation.  
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CHAPTER IV 
ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENT IN AGGREGATE DIVIDENDS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
After Lintner (1956) proposed the well-known behavioral model of dividend policy, a 
number of papers try to model the behavior of dividend in both disaggregate and 
aggregate level. For aggregate level, Marsh and Merton (1987) developed the dynamic 
behavior model of aggregate dividend which has a feature that dividend is adjusted to its 
long run target dividend (i.e., error correction term). Also stock prices instead of 
accounting earnings are used to measure permanent earnings. Garrett and Priestley 
(2000) generalize Lintner model by introducing the manager's optimizing behavior.  In 
their model, they assume that managers have the target dividends, and that adjustment 
costs lead firms not to adjust completely to the target dividends. Therefore, it postulates 
that there are costs associated with adjusting dividends and also costs associated with 
deviating from the target dividend. Under this linear quadratic objective framework, 
managers are trying to minimize these costs by setting the current dividends. They 
derived and estimated the generalized error correction model of dividend behavior which 
can embrace both Lintner model and Marsh and Merton model.  
While most papers have analyzed the dividend behavior in the linear functional form, 
there is some possibility that adjustment of dividends may not be a linear process. One 
stylized fact of dividends behavior documented by Lintner (1956) is that most managers 
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are willing to avoid making changes in dividends that stand a good chance of having to 
be reversed within the near future. Another important feature of dividends behavior is 
that there is asymmetry in dividend payments due to, for instance, a reluctance to cut 
dividends. For example, Yoon and Starks (1995) document the evidence that there is an 
asymmetry between dividend increases and dividend decreases at the individual firm 
level. Jalilvand and Harris (1984) examined the process of partial adjustment by 
allowing speeds of adjustment to vary by firm and over time depending on the size of 
firm and capital market conditions such as interest rates and stock prices. In addition, 
Marsh and Merton (1987) supported asymmetric adjustment of dividends. The 
deterministic component of their model is specified to be reflected "the standard text 
book proposition that, if the current payout is high relative to permanent earnings and 
therefore the retention rate is low, then dividends per share will be expected to grow 
more slowly than if the current payout were lower and the retention rate were 
corresponding higher."(p. 9). 
As Garrett and Priestley (2000) pointed out, in Lintner's partial adjustment dividends 
model, there is no mechanism connecting the cost of adjustment with previous dividends 
and the cost of deviations from the target. 18 However, Managers’ preferences about 
adjustment cost might be different depending on the degree or the sign of dividends 
deviation from the target. In other words the degree of the persistence of dividends 
change may be different depending on the size of dividends deviation from the target. 
                                                 
18
 They point out that Lintner model has an unattractive feature that adjustment of dividends is penalized 
irrespective of whether the adjustment brings the actual value closer to the target, and so in their extended 
model, movement toward the target lowers costs even if adjustment costs prevent a complete movement to 
the target. 
 
  
62 
In this chapter, we examine whether adjustment cost of dividends depends on the 
state of previous difference between dividends and the target. For example, adjustment 
cost of dividends faced by managers may be low (or high) when the previous dividends 
are above the target than when those are below the target. In terms of the speed of 
adjustment, when the previous dividends are above the target, the speed of adjustment 
may be faster (or slower) than when those are below the target. However, we are only 
accepting the hypothesis that the adjustment cost is regime dependent, but we are not 
going to constrain the managers' preferences and either to set the threshold point as zero. 
Rather, those are allowed to be determined in econometric analysis of data.  
Under the regime dependent adjustment cost hypothesis, we are able to induce the 
model in which the changes of dividends follow the nonlinear error correction process 
from managers' optimization problem minimizing the costs of dividends adjustment. 
Therefore, the threshold vector error correction model (VECM) proposed by Hansen and 
Seo (2002) can be used to estimate the nonlinear adjustment process of dividends. 
Specifically, this paper analyzes the asymmetric adjustment behavior of the aggregate 
dividends in stock market with the threshold VECM, which allows for nonlinear 
adjustment cost and cointegration relationship. Dividends are corresponding of S&P 500 
Stock Price Index. Real stock prices are used for a proxy for the target. We find 
significant evidence of threshold effect in dividends adjustment when stock prices are 
used a proxy for the target dividend over 1871q1-2004q2. This suggests that the 
adjustment costs are regime-dependent. We also find that when the difference of 
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dividends and target is higher than the threshold, adjustment cost, which has the inverse 
relation with adjustment speed, is much smaller than that when it is lower. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, the nonlinear version 
of Lintner model is derived from a linear quadratic cost framework proposed by Garrett 
and Priestley (2000). Section 4.3 outlines the econometric methods to assess the 
asymmetric behavior of dividends. The empirical results are reported in Section 4.4 and 
the last section concludes. 
 
4.2 The Model 
 
In this paper, we follow Garrett and Priestley's (2000) framework, which assumes that 
there are two costs associated with adjusting dividends and with deviating from the 
target dividend. 19 The basic assumption of their model is that managers or dividend 
policy makers are trying to minimize the total cost (or loss) from the costs of adjusting 
dividends toward the target dividend and adjustment costs, which are quadratic because 
setting dividends above the target is as costly as setting ones below the target. The 
Lintner model in Garrett and Priestley framework can be derived from the following 
objective function:  
                                     ,)()( 22*
}{
gdddLMin tttd t
−∆+−= ϕφ                                    (4.1) 
                                                 
19
 Basically Garrett and Priestley (2000) assume that adjustment costs lead firms not to adjust completely 
to the target dividends in every time period but instead to follow a pattern of partial adjustment. However, 
Jalilvand and Harris (1984) pointed out market imperfections as one source of partial adjustment.  
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where td  is observed (log) dividends, *td  is target (log) dividends, 1−−=∆ ttt ddd ,  and g 
is a normal growth rate. φ  and ϕ  are positive weighting parameters, which stand for 
deviation cost from the target and adjustment cost from the previous period, respectively. 
If we solve equation (4.1) with respect to td , then the Lintner’s partial adjustment 
model can be derived as follow: 
                              }.){()( 1* −−+++=∆ ttt ddgd ϕφ
φ
ϕφ
ϕ
                                        (4.2) 
Based on the possibility of asymmetric behavior of dividends documented by several 
literature, we assume that adjustment cost (i.e., ϕ ) imposed by managers is regime 
dependent based on the degree or sign of the previous period's deviation from the target. 
Considering this asymmetric adjustment cost, the manager's problem we consider can be 
represented as follows: 
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                                           )(1)( * 1121 γϕ ≤−⋅−∆+ −− ttt ddgd                                    (4.3) 
                                     ),(1)( * 1122 γϕ >−⋅−∆+ −− ttt ddgd  
where 1() is indicator function, and γ  is threshold parameter. 
Differencing equation (4.3) with respect to  td  and arranging it as td , then it yields 
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Next, 1−td  is subtracted from both sides in equation (4.4) and rearranging it gives 
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Also equation (4.5) can be written as 
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which is a nonlinear partial adjustment model where the coefficient of *1 tt dd −−  is 
)/( 1ϕφφ +  when γ≤− −− * 11 tt dd , but )/( 2ϕφφ +  when γ>− −− * 11 tt dd . However, If the 
adjustment cost does not depend on the state of actual dividend's deviation from the 
target in previous period (i.e., )21 ϕϕϕ == , equation (4.6) will be reduced into a linear 
partial adjustment model (i.e., equation (4.2)). 
Now in order to make equation (4.6) be a workable model, the target dividend 
generating process is specified. We assume that the target follows Martingale process, 
then it can be written such as 
                                  ,
*
1
*
ttt dd ε+= −                                                            (4.7) 
where 0)(1 =− ttE ε . 
 Combined with equation (4.7), equation (4.6) can be expressed as 
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Also it can be written as a concise form:  
            )(1)]([ * 11* 1111 γαµ ≤−⋅−−=∆ −−−− ttttt ddddd   
                   ,)(1)]([ * 11* 1122 ttttt udddd +>−⋅−−+ −−−− γαµ                                        (4.9) 
where 0)(1 =− tt uE . Also we get the following coefficients and error term conditions 
from the relation between equation (4.8) and equation (4.9): 
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Equation (4.9) represents the standard nonlinear error correction process, which 
adjustment coefficients depend on the state of * 11 −− − tt dd  i.e., whether γ≤− −− * 11 tt dd  or 
γ>−
−−
*
11 tt dd . 
 
4.3 Econometric Methods 
 
This section develops econometric models that can be used to estimate the nonlinear 
behavior of dividend policy. One problem in estimating equation (4.9) is that it cannot 
be estimated in its current form because target dividends (i.e., * 1−td ) are not observable. 
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Some literature uses the ratio of the fundamentals as a proxy for the target dividend. For 
example, Marsh and Merton (1987) defined the target as a linear function of the lagged 
log prices, while Garrett and Priestley (2000) specified that log target dividends are a 
linear function of log prices and log permanent earnings. In sum, the target can be 
calculated as constant payout ratio times the fundamentals. Following the literature, we 
also assumed that some ratio of the fundamentals ( 1−tf ) will be a good proxy for the log 
target (i.e., 1* 1 −− = tt fd β ). The fundamentals we consider are log prices ( 1−tp ).20 
We denote '),( ttt pdx =  and then the nonlinear (or threshold) vector error correction 
model (VECM) can be defined as follows: 
         )(1][ 1
1
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                          ,)(1][ 1
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,2122 ttit
k
i
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−−  γωωαµ                             (4.10) 
where 0)(1 =− tt eE  and 1() is indicator function. The long-run relationship is defined as 
111 −−− −= ttt pd βω , which is stationary as discussed by Engel and Granger (1987). 
This chapter uses Hansen and Seo (2002)’s a grid-search algorithm for estimating the 
threshold VECM when the cointegrating vector is unknown. In here we briefly explain 
this algorithm.  If we define the parameter vector ,),,,,( '1 ktt −− Γ⋅⋅⋅Γ= αµθ  and fix β  
andγ , then the threshold VECM can be estimated by linear regression 
                                                 
20
 Marsh and Merton (1987) distinguished economic earnings and accounting earnings. The former can be 
represented by stock prices under certain constraints. 
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where '11
' ),,,,1( ktttt xxz −−− ∆⋅⋅⋅∆= ω and ),( γβte  is in equation (4.10) with linear estimates 
for fixed  β  andγ .  
1. Make a grid on [ Lγ , Uγ ] and [ Lβ , Uβ ] based on the linear estimate β~ . 
2. For each value of ),( γβ  on this grid, calculate ),(1 γβθ , ),(2 γβθ and  ),( γβ . 
 3. Get )ˆ,ˆ( γβ  as the values of ),( γβ  on this grid which yields the lowest value of 
|),(|log  γβ . 
4. Find  )ˆ,ˆ( γβ ,  )ˆ,ˆ(1 γβθ , )ˆ,ˆ(2 γβθ and )ˆ,ˆ( γβte . 
For testing, the threshold parameter cannot be identified under the null hypothesis, 
and as a result the standard methods cannot be applied. Therefore, we use the SupLM 
statistic defined in Hansen and Seo (2002), which does not depend on the nuisance 
parameter. 21 
                                            ,],[ nuLn
LM
Sup
SupLM γγγ ∈=  
where Lγ and uγ  satisfy pP Lt =≤− )( 1 γω  and ,1)( 1 pP ut −=>− γω  respectively. The 
threshold parameter Lγ  is the pth percentile of deviation from the target, and uγ  is the 
                                                 
21
 The details are referred to Hansen and Seo (2002). 
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(1-p)th percentile. Depending on the degree of freedom, p -value can be set at 0.05, 0.10, 
or 0.15. The SupLM statistic has a nonstandard asymptotic distribution. Therefore, the 
bootstrapping p -values are calculated, and if the bootstrapping p -values are smaller 
than the size chosen, we reject the null hypothesis. 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
 
The data set used in the estimation consists of the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite 
Stock Price Index and corresponding dividends in quarterly frequency.22 This frequency 
is reflected the fact that public companies usually pay dividends four times a year. The 
data is obtained from Robert Shiller's web site at http:// www.econ.yale.edu. The sample 
spans from 1871q1 to 2004q2. All series are log real values which are calculated by 
taking the log of the relevant variable divided by the consumer price index, and they are 
shown in Figure 4.1. One distinguishing feature is that the dividend series show more 
smooth movement than price series during entire period. 
Since econometric model is based on the existence of cointegration relation between 
dividends and their target, we first analyze their stationary properties using the 
Augmented Dicky and Fuller (ADF) test. As shown in Table 4.1, the unit root 
hypothesis on stock prices can not be rejected both with drift and with drift and trend at 
5% significance level, respectively, but the unit root hypothesis on dividends cannot be 
                                                 
22
 The quarterly data is extracted at quarterly frequency from Schiller’s monthly data. The details are 
referred to Shiller (2000). 
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rejected when only drift is included. Although there is some controversy about the 
stationarity of these variables, in this paper dividends are assumed to follow the 
nonstationary process. 
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Figure 4.1. Real Dividends and Real Prices Series 
 
 
Table 4.1 
ADF Tests for Unit Root  
Variable name td  tp  
With drift -1.628(1) -0.907(0) 
With drift and trend -4.214(2)** -2.386(0) 
Dividends ( td ) and stock prices ( tp ), and earnings( ty ) are all in logs. The lag order for the tests was 
determined by SIC in maximum lags with 18 for quarterly. Critical values are -3.442(1%), -2.867(5%) 
with drift and -3.975(1%), -3.418(5%) with drift and trend for quarterly. ** indicates rejection of null 
hypothesis at 1% significance level. 
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If stock prices are good proxies for the target, those variables should be cointegrated 
with dividends since dividends can not drift away from their target in the long-run. Table 
4.2 shows the cointegration test results between dividends and stock prices by Johansen's 
(1988) reduced rank cointegration test. The likelihood ratio statistics reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration at 1% significance level regardless of target proxies.23 
Thus, we find a long-run relationship between those variables. This long-run relationship 
supports the assumption that stock prices might be good proxy variables for the target 
dividends. 
 
Table 4.2         
Cointegration Tests         
The lag order for the tests was determined by SIC in maximum lags with 12. Critical values are 15.495 
with H   : rank=0 and 3.841 with H   : rank=1. ** (*) indicates rejection of null hypothesis at 1% (5%) 
significance level. 
 
 
Next, we estimate the linear vector error correction model without lag )0( =k , which 
is consistent with the theoretical model derived in Section 4.2, for dividends and stock 
                                                 
23
 Since unit root hypothesis of dividends but prices is rejected with drift and trend, the cointegration test 
results might be come from the stationarity of dividends. Therefore we impose the restriction of (1, 0) on 
cointegrating vector, and then test this restriction statistically. Because Likelihood Ratio statistic is 
calculated at 29.653 with p-value 0.000, that restriction is rejected at 1% significance level. This supports 
that dividends and prices are cointegrated in the sample.   
Model ),( tt pd  ),( tt yd  
LR ( 0H :rank=0) 33.296** 58.772** 
LR ( 0H :rank=1) 0.661 2.087 
Lag length selected 2 2 
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prices.24 Table 4.3 reports the estimation results. The adjustment coefficient of dividends 
is significant at a standard significance level, while that of stock prices is not significant. 
This suggests that the deviation of dividends from their target in previous period is 
adjusted by the change of dividends but by the change of prices. No response of stock 
prices to the deviation seems to support the Miller and Modigliani (1961) hypothesis that 
the dividend policy does not affect the value of firm or stock prices.  
 
Table 4.3       
Estimation of Linear VECM  
Model VECM without lag VECM with 1 lag 
Dependent variable td∆  tp∆  td∆  tp∆  
     
α  -0.050 0.007 -0.047 0.007 
(s.e.) (0.010) (0.032) (0.009) (0.028) 
µ  
-0.043 0.011 -0.038 0.011 
(s.e.) (0.009) (0.031) (0.008) (0.031) 
1−∆ td    0.399 0.112 
(s.e.)   (0.072) (0.108) 
1−∆ tp    -0.016 -0.017 
(s.e.)   (0.022) (0.078) 
     
β  0.585  0.572 
Likelihood 2,517.733  2,563.406 
The bold number indicates that it is significant statistically at 5% significant level. 
 
 
                                                 
24
 We also estimate the linear VECM model for dividends and earnings. However the estimation results do 
not report in here because the test of nonlinear adjustment hypothesis is rejected as shown in Table 4.4. 
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Some papers such as Tsai (2005) pointed the adjustment cost as main factor in the 
sluggish adjustment of dividends. We also can infer the relative importance of deviation 
cost and adjustment cost based on the relationship between adjustment coefficient in a 
linear VECM with the relation with parameters of theoretical model (i.e., )/( ϕφφα += ). 
Since the adjustment coefficient of dividends is only 0.05, we can induce a fact that the 
cost of adjustment (ϕ ) from the previous dividends is very bigger than the cost of 
deviation (φ ) from the target. This confirms the finding of Tsai (2005).25 
Before estimating the nonlinear model of dividends adjustment, we need to test the 
hypothesis of a nonlinear adjustment of dividends. To allow for regime dependent 
adjustment cost of dividends, we use the threshold vector error correction model 
proposed by Hansen and Seo (2002). 26 The test results are reported in Table 4.4. The 
tests for threshold effects support the hypothesis of nonlinear adjustment in dividend 
determination process when stock prices are used for the target. For example, SupLM 
statistic for the tests of nonlinear adjustment in the model ),( tt pd  is calculated at  
17.236 with a bootstrapping p-value of 0.019. The tests are based on the threshold 
VECM without lag and the trimming parameter p=0.10. The bootstrapping p -values are 
calculated on the linear error correction model with 1000 bootstrapping replications.  
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 If two costs are equal, then adjustment coefficient of dividends will be 0.5. But the cost of adjustment is 
19 times larger than the cost of deviation from target since it is 0.05. Tsai (2005) finds the evidence that 
adjustment cost is four times bigger than deviation cost in different model specification from monthly data.  
26
 The gauss program used in this paper is generously provided by Byeongseon Seo. 
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Table 4.4      
Tests for Nonlinear Adjustment 
Model  Without lag  With one lag 
Boottrapping method  Fixed boot  Fixed boot 
       
SupLM  17.236  21.729 
5% c.v.  15.246 14.388  20.769 21.236 
p-value  0.021 0.019  0.035 0.042 
 
 
Table 4.5 shows the estimation results of the threshold VECM, which is estimated by 
maximum likelihood estimation at the VAR lag-length 1 )0( =k . Standard errors are 
calculated from the heteroskedasticity-robust covariance estimator. The trimming 
parameter p is set at 0.10. The threshold estimate is -1.125 and pP Lt =≤− )( 1 γω , and 
pP ut −=>− 1)( 1 γω  are estimated at 0.818, and 0.182, respectively. In Figure 4.2 the 
upper and lower regime are depicted by time. The adjustment speed coefficients of the 
changes of dividends are -0.017 in regime 1 (lower regime) and -0.183 in regime 2 
(upper regime), respectively. As expected in theoretical model the sign of the 
coefficients is negative in both regimes. However, only adjustment coefficient in regime 
2 is significant at a conventional significance level, and also the adjustment speed in 
regime 2 is almost 11 times faster than that in regime 1. This suggests that when 
dividends of previous period are relatively higher than their target, dividends of current 
period move toward the target rapidly when dividends of previous period are relatively 
lower than their target. 
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Table 4.5        
Estimation of Threshold VECM   
Model VECM without lag  VECM with 1 lag 
Dependent variable td∆  tp∆   td∆  tp∆  
1α  -0.017 0.025  -0.031 0.009 
(s.e.) (0.011) (0.023)  (0.011) (0.023) 
1µ  -0.015 0.041  -0.027 0.013 
(s.e.) (0.015) (0.032)  (0.011) (0.024) 
1,1 −∆ td     0.338 0.048 
(s.e.)    (0.078) (0.089) 
1,1 −∆ tp     -0.022 0.098 
(s.e.)    (0.025) (0.055) 
      
2α  -0.183 0.221  -0.203 0.031 
(s.e.) (0.031) (0.288)  (0.043) (0.439) 
2µ  -0.199 0.220  -0.153 0.014 
(s.e.) (0.032) (0.297)  (0.030) (0.300) 
1,2 −∆ td     0.701 0.283 
(s.e.)    (0.094) (0.367) 
1,2 −∆ tp     -0.036 -0.283 
(s.e.)    (0.028) (0.172) 
      
β  0.655  0.598 
γ  
-1.125  -0.748 
21, pp  0.818 0.182  0.898 0.102 
Likelihood 2,532.125  2,585.071 
The bold number indicates that it is significant statistically at 5% significant level. 
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Figure 4.2.  The Upper and Lower Regimes 
 
 
As discussed in above, since adjustment speed coefficients in both regimes are 
smaller than 0.5, the cost of deviation (φ ) from the target is still smaller than the cost of 
adjustment (ϕ ) from the previous dividends. Also we can infer a fact that adjustment 
cost imposed by managers in lower regime is bigger than that in upper regime (i.e., 
21 ϕϕ > ) based on the relation between adjustment speed coefficients in equation (4.10) 
with the parameters in equation (4.8) (i.e., ),/( ii ϕφφα +=  where i=1, 2). This seems to 
contradict the fact that managers are reluctant to decrease dividends generally because 
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the investors may take the decrease as bad signal of weak performance of the firm in the 
future. However, if we consider that the discounted sum of dividend can not exceed to 
the value of the firm which is equal to stock prices in rational expectation framework, 
over payout dividend compared to the value of the firm should be adjusted in the future. 
Next, we test the hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment of dividends in an extended 
model which has lagged terms of the changes of dividends and stock prices )1( =k . The 
number of lag is chosen by SIC in maximum lags with 12 under the vector 
autoregressive model. Generally the estimation results are not much different with those 
of the model without lag terms. The estimation results of a linear VECM ),( tt pd with 
one lag term are reported in right side of Table 4.3. The adjustment speed coefficient is 
significant at standard significance level, and also it is not different with that of a linear 
VECM ),( tt pd without lag term.  For the lag terms, the coefficient of the lag term of 
dividends change is significant statistically and it has relatively big value, while the 
coefficient of the lag term of prices change is not significant statistically. This indicates 
that dividends change shows some persistent movement in this specification. However, 
in prices equation the current change of prices does not affect by any independent 
variables, which supports that past information can not predict the future change of stock 
prices in efficient market.  The test of threshold effect can not be rejected in the model 
),( tt pd  at 5% significance level as shown in bottom of Table 4.4.   
Table 4.5 shows the estimation results of a nonlinear VECM with one lag term )1( =k . 
Compared to the nonlinear VECM without lag term, the biggest difference is that the 
adjustment speed coefficient in lower regime becomes significant statistically. So 
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deviations of dividends from the target in previous period are adjusted by change of 
current dividends in both regimes. Also the adjustment speeds in both regimes are 
increased slightly. Compared to the linear VECM with lag term, still only coefficients of 
lag term of change of dividends at time t-1 in both regimes are significant statistically, 
but those of lag term of change of prices are not. Whereas the change of prices are not be 
influenced by the dividends in both regimes. This still supports the Miller and 
Modigliani hypothesis in this extended specification. In sum the main findings in the 
model without lag term do not change in the extended model with lag term such that the 
hypothesis of regime dependent adjustment cost can not be rejected when stock prices 
are used for the target. The adjustment cost is bigger than the deviation cost from target, 
and also the adjustment cost (adjustment speed) in upper regime is much smaller (faster) 
than that in lower regime.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter assesses the asymmetric adjustment behavior in aggregate dividends 
under the nonlinear Garrett and Priestley's (2000) framework that assumes managers 
minimize the regime dependent adjustment costs associated with being away from their 
target dividend payout. Real stock prices are used for a proxy for the target. By using the 
threshold vector error correction model, we find significant evidence of threshold effect 
in adjustment behavior of aggregate dividends of S&P 500 Index in quarterly data when 
real stock prices are used a proxy for the target dividend. This result indicates that the 
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speed of adjustment of dividends is different depending on the regime defined the 
difference between dividends and target in previous period. More specifically, the 
adjustment speed of dividends in upper-regime, where dividends are relatively higher 
than the target, is much faster than that in lower-regime, where dividends are relatively 
lower than the target. 
In this chapter we only consider asymmetric adjustment of dividends based on the 
degree of the difference between dividends and target, but the other form of asymmetric 
adjustment of dividends also may be plausible. For example, as suggested by Jalilvand 
and Harris (1984), adjustment speed of dividends might depends on the condition of 
capital market such interest rates, stock prices etc. We leave this as future works. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation investigates three different economic issues. The first issue is 
whether the monetary policy rules can improve forecasting accuracy of inflation. The 
second one is whether the preference of central bank is symmetry or not. The last issue is 
whether the behavior of aggregate dividends is asymmetry. Each issue is covered in 
Chapter II, III and IV, respectively. 
The Chapter II begins with the rational expectation model. This model implies that 
nominal interest rates reflect expectations of inflation, and thus the term structure of 
interest rates provides information on the future change in inflation. However, the 
monetary authority manipulates the short-term interest rate in response to the change in 
the price level, and accordingly the prediction of inflation cannot be separated from the 
monetary policy. 
In this chapter, we undertake an empirical analysis of this linkage using the U.S. 
monthly data for the period January 1960-December 2004. First, we estimate the long-
run Taylor rule, which is composed of the federal funds rate and the 12-month inflation 
rate. The coefficient of reaction to inflation varies depending on the sample period and 
across the monetary policy regimes. Second, the prediction of inflation is found to be 
associated with the Fed's reaction to inflation. The coefficient of the term structure is 
significant for the sample period when the coefficient of reaction to inflation is close to 
unity. As the parameter of reaction to inflation increases, the predictive information 
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contained in the term structure becomes weaker. This result explains the previous 
empirical findings that the predictive information of the term structure varies depending 
on the sample period. Third, an assessment of the prediction performance regarding 
future change in inflation is provided using the long-run Taylor rule. The empirical 
results indicate that the long-run Taylor rule improves forecasting accuracy. 
In the Chapter III, we investigate the asymmetric preferences of central bank of Korea 
under New Keynesian sticky prices forward-looking economy framework. In this end, 
this chapter adopts the central bank’s objective functional form as the linear-exponential 
function over inflation gap or/and output gap instead of the standard quadratic function. 
We derive the monetary policy reaction function, and then estimate the derived policy 
reaction function during the inflation targeting period: 1998:9-2005:12. With caution we 
conclude that the AS curve may not be nonlinear form because the cross-product term of 
inflation gap and output gap is not significant and its sign is wrong. Second, with a linear 
AS curve the Bank of Korea have an asymmetric preference over inflation gap but not 
output gap. Third, since the sign of the preference parameter is positive, it appears that 
the Bank of Korea has the more weight on positive deviations of inflation from target 
than on negative ones, which supports the hypothesis of precautionary demand for 
inflation.  
The Chapter IV assesses the asymmetric adjustment behavior in aggregate dividends. 
In this end, we derived the nonlinear dividend adjustment model under the hypothesis 
that managers minimize the regime dependent adjustment costs associated with being 
away from their target dividend payout. 
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By using the threshold vector error correction model, we find significant evidence of 
threshold effect in adjustment behavior of aggregate dividends of S&P 500 Index in 
quarterly data when stock prices are used a proxy for the target dividend. This indicates 
that the adjustment cost is regime-dependent. We also find that when dividends are 
relatively higher than target in previous period, the adjustment cost (speed) of dividends 
is smaller (faster) than that of dividends when they are relatively lower. 
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APPENDIX 
ASYMMETRIC PREFERENCE                                                                              
UNDER PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT OF INTEREST RATE 
 
In this appendix we test the asymmetric preferences of central bank where its 
objective function is different with that in Section 3.2.2, i.e., 2*)( iit −  replaces 21)( −− tt ii  
in the period loss function for interest rate stabilization, which is used in Surcio (2003b) 
and Karagedikli and Lees (2004), etc. Therefore, the loss function has the following 
equation: 
,)(
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where the parameter κ  is strictly positive and govern the relative weight that central 
bank places on interest rate stabilization relative to inflation stabilization.  
With the same economy framework used in Section 3.2.1, the first order condition 
(FOC) for minimizing the loss of central bank can be derived as 
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By taking the first order Taylor series expansion at 0=== ψφϕ , then equation (A.2) 
can be written as   
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where tε  represents the higher order of the Taylor series expansion. Solving for ti  and 
the expected inflation and output gap are replaced by actual values, then the nonlinear 
monetary policy reaction function can be derived. However, it is generally believed that 
central banks have a tendency to smooth changes in interest rates. Following the 
literature such as Clarida et al. (1998), the actual interest rate is assumed to partially 
adjusts to the target such as: 
.)1( 1* −+−= ttt iii ρρ                                                     (A.4) 
Combining this partial adjustment process with equation (A.3), then the empirical 
interest rate reaction function can be written as follows: 
,)}~~(~~~~){1( 162524321 tttttttt uiycyccyccci t +++++++−= −ρpipipiρ                 (A.5) 
which is linear in the coefficients. Also we get the following coefficients and error term 
conditions related with equation (A.3) and (A.5):               
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. 
The error term is a linear combination of forecast errors and thus orthogonal to any 
variable in the information set available at t-1. Therefore, based on this orthogonality 
condition, coefficients in equation (A.5) can be estimated by the generalized method of 
moments (GMM). From the reduced coefficients, we can recover the asymmetric 
preferences over inflation gap and output gap such as 13 /2 cc=ϕ , and 24 /2 cc=φ .  
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The central bank’s reaction function, i.e., equation (A.5), is estimated by the GMM 
using the same instruments in Section 3.3.2. Table A.1 reports the results of estimating 
reaction functions. Over various specifications the estimates of interest rate smoothing 
coefficients are all significant and are ranged from 0.848 to 0.923, which are greater than 
those for Australia, New Zealand, US and European Area documented by Karagedikli 
and Lees (2004) and Surcio (2003b) using the similar framework. This means that the 
Bank of Korea has changed the interest rate toward the target rate very slowly compared 
to other central banks. The constant estimates, which represent the target interest rate, in 
nonlinear reaction functions are very close to a value of 4.032 in linear case.  
In here, we look at the results of estimating the nonlinear reaction function with 
square terms of inflation gap and output gap shown in Panel D. When the cross term is 
not considered, square of inflation gap but output gap is significant at 1% significance 
level. It seems to support only asymmetric preference over inflation. However, the cross 
term is included, square terms of both inflation gap and output gap are significant but 
coefficient of output gap become insignificant.  We estimate asymmetric parameters and 
test their significance, and the estimation results are reported in Table A.2. When only 
inflation asymmetry or output asymmetry is considered, they are significant and have 
expected sign suggested by Cukierman and Muscatelli (2003). However, only inflation 
asymmetry is significant when preference asymmetries over inflation gap and output gap 
are considered. This result is consistent with that in Section 3.3.2. But its size is much 
bigger than that (i.e., 0.483) reported in there. 
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Table A.1 
Reduced Form Estimates of Reaction Function- Partial Adjustment 
Model ρ  1c  2c  3c  4c  5c  6c  J 2R  
Panel A: Linear reaction function 
(1) 0.888** 4.032** 0.343** 0.233**    0.131 0.980 
 (0.008) (0.073) (0.103) (0.035)      
Panel B: Nonlinear reaction function with inflation gap only 
(2) 0.855** 3.922** 0.746** 0.193** 0.429**   0.118 0.978 
 (0.011) (0.083) (0.145) (0.022) (0.069)     
          
(3) 0.873** 3.940** 0.780** 0.158** 0.329**  -0.062* 0.120 0.982 
 (0.010) (0.093) (0.162) (0.035) (0.065)  (0.030)   
Panel C: Nonlinear reaction function with output gap only 
(4) 0.923** 4.037** 0.047 0.352**  -0.019**  0.103 0.983 
 (0.011) (0.083) (0.135) (0.062)  (0.006)    
          
(5) 0.922** 4.046** -0.002 0.375**  -0.021** 0.023 0.102 0.983 
 (0.011) (0.088) (0.136) (0.081)  (0.007) (0.036)   
Panel D: Nonlinear reaction function with inflation gap and output gap 
(6) 0.848** 3.914** 0.756** 0.185** 0.434** 0.002  0.116 0.976 
 (0.017) (0.082) (0.143) (0.027) (0.068) (0.003)    
          
(7) 0.849** 3.819** 1.148** 0.023 0.444** 0.013* -0.124* 0.102 0.975 
 (0.022) (0.136) (0.270) (0.070) (0.109) (0.005) (0.052)   
Estimation model is as follows: .)}~~(~~~~){1( 162524321 ttttttt iycyccyccci tt µρpipipiρ +++++++−= −  The 
estimation period is from 1998:9 to 2005:12. Output gap is obtained from percentage change of actual and 
detrending industrial production index with quadratic trend equation for the sample period 1998:1-2005:12.  
The instrument sets include constant and five lags of core inflation, output gap, long-short interest rate 
spread and call rate. The superscript **, * and + denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true 
coefficient is zero at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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Table A.2 
 Estimates of the Asymmetric Policy Preferences- Partial Adjustment 
Model  Inflation gap (ϕ ) Output gap (γ ) J 2R  
Panel A: Inflation gap only 
(2)  0.783** - 0.122 0.983 
  (0.106)    
      
(3)  0.844** - 0.120 0.982 
  (0.099)    
Panel B: Output gap only 
(4)  - -0.108** 0.103 0.983 
   (0.021)   
      
(5)  - -0.110** 0.102 0.983 
   (0.020)   
Panel C: Inflation gap and output gap  
(6)  1.148 0.022 - - 
  (-) (-)   
      
(7)  0.744** 1.117 0.102 0.975 
  (0.134) (3.700)   
The estimation period is from 1998:9 to 2005:12. Output gap is obtained from percentage change of actual 
and detrending industrial production index with quadratic trend equation for the sample period 1998:1-
2005:12. The instrument sets include constant and five lags of CPI inflation, output gap, long-short 
interest rate spread and call rate. The superscript **, * and + denote the rejection of the null hypothesis 
that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 pecent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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